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Abstract 
Researchers have investigated the role of hope as a protective factor against suicide. Of 
the 3 factors posited by Joiner’s interpersonal theory of suicide (IPTS) to be necessary 
before suicide can occur, increased hope has been shown to reduce 2 (thwarted 
belongingness and perceived burdensomeness), but, counterintuitively, to increase the 3rd 
(acquired capability for suicide). A fuller understanding of this phenomenon may lie with 
Bernardo’s locus-of-hope construct—pursuant to which hope may lie not only in one’s 
own plans and capabilities (internal locus-of-hope) but in those of others (external locus-
of-hope)—but to date no study has researched the relationship between external locus-of-
hope and acquired capability for suicide. The purpose of this quantitative study was to 
contribute to the understanding of hope and suicidality by examining the following 
research question: Is there a relationship between external locus-of-hope and acquired 
capability for suicide? The study used existing objective instruments to measure levels of 
hope and acquired capability for suicide. Data from a sample recruited online (N = 193) 
was analyzed using a 3-step hierarchical regression procedure designed to isolate the 
effects of external locus-of-hope on acquired capability for suicide. Results confirmed 
that internal locus-of-hope raises acquired capability for suicide and demonstrated that 
external locus-of-hope has the opposite effect: it is associated with lowered acquired 
capability for suicide. It follows that interventions designed to raise one’s level of 
externally located hope have the potential to deter suicidal individuals from actualizing 
their plans. This study thus has implications for positive social change by contributing to 
the saving of lives.  
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Chapter 1: Introduction to the Study 
Introduction 
Every year, more than 800,000 people worldwide die due to suicide (World 
Health Organization [WHO], 2016); for every adult who does, between 20 and 25 more 
people may have attempted it (Drapeau & McIntosh, 2015; WHO, 2016). In 2015,  
suicide was the leading cause of death after unintentional injury for Americans between 
15 and 34 years of age (Centers for Disease Control and Prevention [CDC], 2016). 
Beck (1963) first identified a relationship between suicide and hope, but he and 
subsequent researchers have tended to focus on the absence of hope—hopelessness—
rather than its presence. Wingate et al. (2006) proposed studying suicidal behavior from 
the perspective of positive psychology, and research in this tradition has investigated the 
role of hope as a protective factor against suicide. The predominant theory of hope is that 
of Snyder (Snyder et al., 1991; Snyder, 2002), described below. A thorough 
understanding of the relationship between hope and suicidality may help clinicians save 
lives. 
In this chapter, I will discuss the backgrounds of hope research, suicide research, 
and their interrelation, as well as the problem statement that illustrates the gap in current 
knowledge of this area. I will describe the purpose of the present study and the specific 
research question I addressed. I will set forth the definitions, assumptions, scope, and 
limitations of the study before the chapter concludes with the significance of the present 
research. 
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Background 
Snyder and colleagues (Snyder et al., 1991; Snyder, 2002) proposed a cognitive 
theory of hope, defining hope as the degree to which people perceive themselves as 
having the capacity to form alternative pathways toward goal attainment (“pathways 
thought”), coupled with a sense of successful determination, the degree to which they 
believe themselves actually capable of taking the actions dictated by those pathways 
(“agency thought”). Snyder’s hope theory has become one of the main theories of hope in 
the literature, because of the availability of reliable measures he developed with his 
colleagues (Bernardo, 2010). In an important extension of Snyder’s theory, Bernardo 
(2010) noted that Snyder’s conceptualization of hope takes into account only an 
individual’s own sense of agency and the plans or pathways generated by him or her. 
Bernardo therefore introduced the concept of locus-of-hope, pursuant to which agents 
other than an individual, and plans generated by others, can also contribute to goal 
attainment. Bernardo validated an instrument called the Locus-of-Hope Scale, which 
measures not only Snyder’s internal locus-of-hope but three external loci-of-hope based 
on the contributions to goal attainment of family, peers, and spiritual or supernatural 
forces (e.g., G-d or fate). 
Joiner (2005) proposed the interpersonal theory of suicide (IPTS), in which he 
recognized that for a person to die by suicide, he or she must possess not only the desire 
to do so but the capability to actualize that desire. Simply put, not everyone who wishes 
to commit suicide has the nerve to carry it off. Joiner identified three variables that must 
all be present for completed suicide to occur: Thwarted belongingness (a feeling of social 
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isolation) and perceived burdensomeness (the feeling that one is a burden to others) 
jointly create the desire to end one’s life; acquired capability for suicide (the habituation 
to pain, to fear of death, etc. that can come with repeated exposure to painful and 
provocative experience) constitutes the third necessary ingredient. 
Davidson, Wingate, Rasmussen, and Slish (2009) investigated the relationship of 
hope as formulated by Snyder (2002) to the three components of the IPTS. Contrary to 
their hypothesis, which called for hope to be inversely related to thwarted belongingness, 
perceived burdensomeness, and acquired capability for suicide, they found that high-hope 
individuals actually had a greater degree of acquired capability for suicide. This finding 
has been replicated in subsequent studies (e.g., Davidson, Wingate, Slish, & Rasmussen, 
2010; Mitchell, Cukrowicz, Van Allen, & Seegan, 2015). 
Problem Statement 
To explain their unexpected results, Davidson et al. (2009) suggested that since 
high-hope individuals likely have more goals and engage in more attempts to reach these, 
they also likely have more experience of failure and pain that contribute, through 
habituation, to acquired capability for suicide. This idea, however, has not been 
empirically tested and seems inadequate to explain the apparent connection between hope 
and acquired capability for suicide. An accurate understanding is important so that 
treatment interventions with suicidal individuals target the appropriate factors. A fuller 
understanding of this phenomenon may lie with the concept of locus-of-hope, but to date 
no study has researched the relationship between external loci-of-hope and acquired 
capability for suicide. 
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Purpose of the Study 
The purpose of this study was to contribute to our understanding of hope and 
suicidality by examining the relationship between external loci-of-hope (family, peers, 
spiritual factors), which were the independent variables, and acquired capability for 
suicide, the dependent variable. I used the quantitative research paradigm in which the 
above variables and relevant demographic information from participants were subjected 
to statistical analysis. I conjectured that only internally located hope (i.e., hope as defined 
by Snyder, 2002) was directly related to acquired capability for suicide, but that all three 
external loci-of-hope were inversely related to acquired capability for suicide. 
Research Questions and Hypotheses 
There were four specific research questions to be determined in this study: 
RQ1: Is there a relationship between external locus-of-hope (operationalized 
below as “general hope [external]”) and acquired capability for suicide? 
H01: There is no relationship between general hope (external) and acquired 
capability for suicide. 
Ha1: There is a negative relationship between general hope (external) and 
acquired capability for suicide. 
RQ2: Is there a relationship between general hope (external–family) and acquired 
capability for suicide? 
H02: There is no relationship between general hope (external–family) and 
acquired capability for suicide. 
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Ha2: There is a negative relationship between general hope (external–family) 
and acquired capability for suicide. 
RQ3: Is there a relationship between general hope (external–peers) and acquired 
capability for suicide? 
H03: There is no relationship between general hope (external–peers) and 
acquired capability for suicide. 
Ha3: There is a negative relationship between general hope (external–peers) 
and acquired capability for suicide. 
RQ4: Is there a relationship between general hope (external–spiritual) and 
acquired capability for suicide? 
H04: There is no relationship between general hope (external–spiritual) and 
acquired capability for suicide. 
Ha4: There is a negative relationship between general hope (external–spiritual) 
and acquired capability for suicide. 
In all cases, the independent variables were external hope and each of its three 
specific loci (external–family, external–peers, and external–spiritual), each as measured 
by its respective score on the Locus-of-Hope Scale (LOHS; Bernardo, 2010). The 
dependent variable was acquired capability for suicide, as measured by the Acquired 
Capability for Suicide Scale—Fearlessness About Death (ACSS-FAD; Ribeiro et al., 
2014). 
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Theoretical Foundation 
The theoretical bases for this study were Snyder’s (2002) view of hope as a joint 
function of pathways thought and agency thought, as expanded by Bernardo (2010) to 
include pathways and agency of others; as well as Joiner’s (2005) interpersonal theory of 
suicide (IPTS), pursuant to which thwarted belongingness, perceived burdensomeness, 
and acquired capability for suicide are all necessary for completed suicide to occur. These 
theories will be explained at greater length in Chapter 2. 
Prior research has established a direct (positive) relationship between hope (and 
its pathways and agency components) and acquired capability for suicide. In the present 
study, I sought to examine whether this counterintuitive relationship held true for 
externally located hope (Bernardo, 2010), that is, when the source of an individual’s hope 
is not their own pathways and agency but those of another. 
Nature of the Study 
In this quantitative study, I used objective instruments to measure levels of hope 
and all its components (internal, external–family, external–peers, and external–spiritual), 
as well as the three factors of the IPTS (thwarted belongingness, perceived 
burdensomeness, and acquired capability for suicide). Hope and its components were the 
independent variables and acquired capability for suicide was the dependent variable. 
Age, gender, marital status, income, and depression were included as covariates. 
I drew the sample (N = 193) from an Internet participant pool using the online 
task platform Mechanical Turk. As detailed in Chapter 4, participants were mostly White, 
with a broad range of income and over half within the 21–49 age range. Men represented 
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just under 60% of the sample. Participants were directed to the online survey site 
SurveyMonkey and asked to complete the Locus-of-Hope Scale (Bernardo, 2010); the 
Interpersonal Needs Questionnaire (INQ–15; Van Orden, Cukrowicz, Witte, & Joiner, 
2012); the Acquired Capability for Suicide Scale—Fearlessness about Death (ACSS—
FAD; Ribeiro et al., 2014); and the Depression Anxiety Stress Scales–21 (DASS–21; 
Lovibond & Lovibond, 1995). As will be discussed in Chapter 3, these four measures 
have been used in similar research in the past. 
Finally, I asked participants to provide demographic and socioeconomic 
information, so I could determine whether these variables affected the data in any way. I 
then subjected the data to multiple regression analysis to determine whether relationships 
existed between and among them and if so, what those relationships were. Multiple 
regression was the appropriate statistical method for use in this study because of its utility 
for helping to understand the nature of a phenomenon when testing a theory (Licht, 1995; 
Tabachnick & Fidell, 2007). Furthermore, use of this technique was necessary because it 
had been used in prior research that the present study sought to extend (Anestis, Moberg, 
& Arnau, 2014; Davidson et al., 2009, 2010; O’Keefe & Wingate, 2013). 
Definitions 
For the purpose of this study, the following terms were operationally defined (all 
terms related to hope were operationally defined with reference to the Locus-of-Hope 
Scale [LOHS; Bernardo, 2010]): 
Acquired capability for suicide (ACS): The total score (i.e., after adjusting for 
three reverse-scored items, the sum of the seven item scores) obtained on the Acquired 
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Capability for Suicide Scale—Fearlessness About Death (ACSS-FAD; Ribeiro et al., 
2014). 
Agency hope (external): The total score obtained by summing the agency items on 
the three external locus-of-hope subscales (external–family, external–peers, and external–
spiritual) of the LOHS. 
Agency hope (external–family): The total score obtained by summing the agency 
items (i.e., items 3, 21, 24, 32) on the external–family locus-of-hope subscale of the 
LOHS. 
Agency hope (external–peers): The total score obtained by summing the agency 
items (i.e., items 10, 13, 26, 35) on the external–peers locus-of-hope subscale of the 
LOHS. 
Agency hope (external–spiritual): The total score obtained by summing the 
agency items (i.e., items 2, 15, 17, 34) on the external–spiritual locus-of-hope subscale of 
the LOHS. 
Agency hope (internal): The total score obtained by summing the agency items 
(i.e., items 6, 27, 30, 40) on the internal locus-of-hope subscale of the LOHS. 
General hope (external): The total score obtained by summing all 24 items on the 
three external locus-of-hope subscales (external–family, external–peers, and external–
spiritual) of the LOHS. 
General hope (external–family): The total score obtained by summing all eight 
items on the external–family locus-of-hope subscale of the LOHS (i.e., items 3, 7, 11, 16, 
21, 24, 32, 39). 
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General hope (external–peers): The total score obtained by summing all eight 
items on the external–peers locus-of-hope subscale of the LOHS (i.e., items 5, 10, 13, 19, 
26, 33, 35, 38). 
General hope (external–spiritual): The total score obtained by summing all eight 
items on the external–spiritual locus-of-hope subscale of the LOHS (i.e., items 2, 9, 15, 
17, 22, 28, 34, 36). 
General hope (internal): The total score obtained by summing all eight items on 
the internal locus-of-hope subscale of the LOHS (i.e., items 1, 6, 14, 20, 23, 27, 30, 40). 
Note that (except for two minor rewordings discussed in Chapter 3) these are the identical 
items as the non-filler items of the Trait Hope Scale (Snyder, 2002); for this reason, a 
person’s score on the internal locus-of-hope subscale of the LOHS should be the same as 
that person’s score on the Trait Hope Scale. And, as with the Trait Hope Scale itself, 
whose total score is the sum of its pathways and agency subscales, the internal locus-of-
hope subscale score on the LOHS is the sum of its own pathways and agency 
components. 
Overall agency hope: The total score obtained by summing all agency items on 
the LOHS (i.e., items 2, 3, 6, 10, 13, 15, 17, 21, 24, 26, 27, 30, 32, 34, 35, 40). 
Overall general hope: The total score obtained by summing all items on the 
LOHS except the eight filler items (i.e., except items 4, 8, 12, 18, 25, 29, 31, 37). 
Overall pathways hope: The total score obtained by summing all pathways items 
on the LOHS (i.e., items 1, 5, 7, 9, 11, 14, 16, 19, 20, 22, 23, 28, 33, 36, 38, 39). 
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Pathways hope (external): The total score obtained by summing the pathways 
items on the three external locus-of-hope subscales (external–family, external–peers, and 
external–spiritual) of the LOHS. 
Pathways hope (external–family): The total score obtained by summing the 
pathways items (i.e., items 7, 11, 16, 39) on the external–family locus-of-hope subscale 
of the LOHS. 
Pathways hope (external–peers): The total score obtained by summing the 
pathways items (i.e., items 5, 19, 33, 38) on the external–peers locus-of-hope subscale of 
the LOHS. 
Pathways hope (external–spiritual): The total score obtained by summing the 
pathways items (i.e., items 9, 22, 28, 36) on the external–spiritual locus-of-hope subscale 
of the LOHS. 
Pathways hope (internal): The total score obtained by summing the pathways 
items (i.e., items 1, 14, 20, 23) on the internal locus-of-hope subscale of the LOHS. 
Perceived burdensomeness (PB): The sum of the item scores obtained on the 
perceived burdensomeness subscale (items 1–6) of the INQ-15. 
Suicidality: The term “suicidality” has been used very broadly in the literature, 
leading to imprecision. In 2007, Silverman, Berman, Sanddal, O’Carroll, & Joiner 
proposed a revised nomenclature of suicidology in which the term suicidality is replaced 
by the term “suicide-related behaviors.” Van Orden et al. (2010), in their presentation of 
the interpersonal theory of suicide, expressly state, 
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Our discussion below draws on—and is consistent with—a recently revised 
nomenclature (Silverman, Berman, Sanddal, O’Carroll, & Joiner, 2007b), which 
posits that suicide-related behaviors (previously referred to as suicidality) can be 
classified as ideations (i.e., thoughts), communications, and behaviors. (p. 576) 
This seems to imply that—for Van Orden et al. (2010), at least; note that this 
seems clearly not to be the case for Silverman et al. (2007)—the term “behavior” (as in 
“suicide-related behaviors”) is used in the broad, behaviorist sense to include not only 
actions but also thoughts and “communications” (statements, writing, gestures, etc.). Van 
Orden et al. note, however, that the term “suicide-related behaviors” does not distinguish 
between behaviors with intent to die and those without intent to die; accordingly, they 
qualify their terminology with the statement, “As the current theory is concerned with 
ideations, communications, and behaviors that involve some degree of intent to die, we 
use the term suicidal behavior rather than suicide-related behaviors” (p. 576). Based on 
this, in this study involving the IPTS, the term suicidality—when used—refers to Van 
Orden et al.’s “suicidal behavior”: that is, ideations, communications, and behaviors that 
involve some degree of intent to die. 
Thwarted belongingness (TB): After adjusting for six reverse-scored items, the 
sum of the item scores obtained on the thwarted belongingness subscale (items 7–15) of 
the Interpersonal Needs Questionnaire (INQ-15; Van Orden, Cukrowicz, Witte, & Joiner, 
2012). 
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Assumptions 
For the purposes of this study, I made the following assumptions: First, that the 
respective questionnaires accurately reflected participants’ levels of the constructs they 
purported to measure. Second, that participants’ responses were not arbitrary, made with 
intent to deceive, or otherwise inaccurate. Third, that the dependent variable, acquired 
capability for suicide, is properly a continuous (rather than a dichotomous) variable; that 
is, ACS can be measured along a continuum from lower to higher levels of the construct 
rather than as being either present or absent. This latter assumption is necessary to justify 
use of multiple (rather than logistic) regression in analyzing the data (Licht, 1995; 
Tabachnick & Fidell, 2007), is consistent with prior studies on this topic, and seems 
supported by Van Orden et al. (2010). Indeed, Ribeiro et al. (2014) state, “the construct 
of acquired capability exists on a continuum in both clinical and nonclinical populations” 
(p. 117). 
Scope and Delimitations 
In this study, I sought to determine whether a relationship existed between each of 
the three external loci-of-hope (family, peers, spiritual factors) and acquired capability 
for suicide. To do so, I relied on the definition of hope first propounded by Snyder et al. 
(1991), as extended by Bernardo (2010); as well as the interpersonal theory of suicide 
(Joiner, 2005; Van Orden et al., 2010). I did not consider other theories of hope and/or 
suicide in this study, leaving open the possibility of different results if, for example, I had 
defined and measured hope differently. 
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Limitations 
In this study, I used a correlational research design, which carries the risk that 
confounding variables may influence results. Education and age are examples of such 
potential confounds. In their earlier study on hope and suicide, Davidson et al. (2010) 
explained their choice of covariates by pointing out that age, gender, marital status, and 
income have each been associated with suicide risk. I attempted to eliminate the effects 
of confounding, as well as to maintain consistency with prior research, by statistically 
controlling for these as well. 
Despite this, certain limitations remain. I used questionnaires for data gathering, 
which may have been subject to response bias. Additionally, I used more recent versions 
of some of the instruments used in prior studies. Davidson et al. (2009, 2010) measured 
hope using the Revised Trait Hope Scale (Shorey et al., 2007); O’Keefe & Wingate 
(2013) and Anestis et al. (2014) did so using the Trait Hope Scale (Snyder et al., 1991); 
in the present study, I measured hope using the Locus-of-Hope Scale (Bernardo, 2010). 
Likewise, Davidson et al. (2009, 2010) and O’Keefe & Wingate (2013) used the original 
Acquired Capability for Suicide Scale (ACSS; Van Orden, Witte, Gordon, Bender, & 
Joiner, 2008) whereas the present study used the ACSS-FAD (Ribeiro et al., 2014). And 
Davidson et al. (2009, 2010) and O’Keefe & Wingate (2013) used the original 
Interpersonal Needs Questionnaire (INQ; Van Orden, Merrill, & Joiner, 2005; Van Orden 
et al., 2008) to measure both perceived burdensomeness and thwarted belongingness; 
these constructs were measured by Anestis et al. (2014) using a version known as the 
INQ-10 (Bryan, 2011); whereas in the present study I used the INQ-15 (Van Orden, 
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Cukrowicz, Witte, & Joiner, 2012). Given that the updated instruments used in this study 
were developed by the same research group that developed the originals and were 
intended as refinements and improvements of the former versions (or, in the case of the 
LOHS, incorporate the former version virtually verbatim), I believed these minor 
variations in versions of the same instrument would not affect the results of the study. 
Indeed, the prior researchers cited in this paragraph did not even mention this point in 
their own studies. Nevertheless, although unlikely, the possibility exists that these 
variations could have affected the study’s reliability and/or validity. 
One theoretical aspect of the above, however, bears further mention. Pursuant to 
the IPTS, acquired capability for suicide comprises both fearlessness about death and 
elevated pain tolerance. The ACSS-FAD (Ribeiro et al., 2014)—used in this study and in 
which the acronym “FAD” stands for “fearlessness about death”—was developed partly 
because the original ACSS was found to measure substantially fearlessness about death, 
with only one item addressing elevated pain tolerance (Ribeiro et al., 2014, p. 117–188, 
123). As this fact applies equally to this study and the prior research discussed in the 
previous paragraph, it is not relevant to the validity of conclusions based on comparisons 
with prior research. Furthermore, despite this shortcoming, the ACSS-FAD is used to 
measure the total construct of acquired capability for suicide; as Ribeiro et al. (2014) 
noted, “Fearlessness about death was also related to a number of outcomes associated 
with pain perception, including self-perceived ability to withstand physical discomfort 
and fear of physical pain, as well as a behavioral assessment of pain tolerance” (p.124). 
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Nevertheless, the instrument in question would be more satisfying as a measure of 
acquired capability for suicide if it also directly measured elevated pain tolerance. 
Significance 
This project was unique because it addressed an underresearched area of hope 
theory in a way that not only advanced knowledge in the discipline but may eventually 
contribute to positive treatment outcomes and even save lives. The study demonstrated 
that external locus-of-hope is associated with lowered acquired capability for suicide; it 
follows that interventions designed to raise one’s level of externally located hope have 
the potential to deter suicidal individuals from actualizing their plans. In fact, if it is true 
that internally located hope can raise one’s acquired capability for suicide, then helping a 
suicidal person shift his or her locus-of-hope from internal to external could prove 
crucial. There can be no greater contribution to positive social change than the saving of 
life. 
Summary 
In this chapter, I outlined in brief what will be elaborated on more fully in Chapter 
2. The backgrounds of Snyder’s (2002) hope theory and Bernardo’s (2010) extension 
thereof; the interpersonal theory of suicide (Joiner, 2005); and their interrelation were 
discussed, followed by a problem statement pointing out a gap in our knowledge of this 
area: we did not know whether, and how, existing research applied to Bernardo’s external 
locus-of-hope. I then described the purpose of the present study—to fill this gap in 
knowledge—and the specific research questions it addressed: is there a relationship 
between external locus-of-hope and/or each of its three subcategories (family, peers, 
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spiritual factors) and acquired capability for suicide? Specific definitions of the relevant 
variables and terms, as well as assumptions, scope, and limitations of the study, were set 
forth before the chapter concluded by highlighting the significance of the present 
research. 
In Chapter 2, I expand on the above by providing the context in which the present 
study took place, in the form of an exhaustive review of what was previously known in 
this area. 
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Chapter 2: Review of the Literature 
Introduction 
Several definitions of hope have been advanced over the years. Early on, Stotland 
(1969) wrote that hope simply refers to “an expectation about goal attainment” (p. 2). 
Much later, Scioli, Ricci, Nyugen, and Scioli (2011) defined hope as “a future-directed, 
four-channel emotion network, constructed from biological, psychological, and social 
resources. The four constituent channels are the mastery, attachment, survival, and 
spiritual systems (or subnetworks)” (p. 79; italics omitted). With this impressive 
definition, Scioli et al. (2011) purported to offer “an integrative theory of hope, 
highlighting the motives of attachment, mastery, and survival, as well as spiritual beliefs” 
(p. 92). In recent years, a cognitive theory of hope has come to dominate the field, in 
which hope is defined as a combination of “a sense of successful determination in 
meeting goals” and “perceived availability of successful pathways related to goals” 
(Snyder et al., 1991, p. 570). Snyder et al. (1991; see also Snyder, 2002) referred to these 
two components as willpower or agency thought and waypower or pathways thought, 
respectively. Bernardo (2010) extended Snyder’s hope theory, which focuses on one’s 
own agency and available pathways with respect to goals, to include the agency and the 
pathways of others. Bernardo thus defined four loci-of-hope: Snyder’s internal locus-of-
hope plus three external loci-of-hope based on the contributions to goal attainment of 
family, peers, and spiritual or supernatural forces. 
A number of theories have also been propounded as to why people commit 
suicide. The driving force behind suicide has been conceived of as ranging from broad, 
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sociological factors (Durkheim, 1897/2006) to deeply personal, psychoanalytic ones 
(Sullivan, 1953); as well as to the fairly obvious, such as unbearable psychological pain 
(Shneidman, 1996). One theory that has garnered a good deal of respect in recent years is 
that of Joiner (2005; Van Orden et al., 2010), known variously as the interpersonal theory 
of suicide or the interpersonal-psychological theory of suicidal behavior (IPTS). Joiner 
posited that for completed suicide to occur, three variables must all be present 
simultaneously: thwarted belongingness (a feeling of social isolation); perceived 
burdensomeness (the feeling that one is a burden to others); and the acquired capability 
for suicide (the habituation to pain, to fear of death, etc. that can come with prior 
exposure to painful and provocative experience). 
Davidson, Wingate, Rasmussen, and Slish (2009) investigated the relationship of 
hope as formulated by Snyder (2002) to the three components of the IPTS. Contrary to 
their hypothesis, which called for hope to be inversely related to thwarted belongingness, 
perceived burdensomeness, and acquired capability for suicide, they found that high-hope 
individuals actually had a greater degree of acquired capability for suicide. This finding 
has been replicated in subsequent studies (e.g., Davidson, Wingate, Slish, & Rasmussen, 
2010; Mitchell, Cukrowicz, Van Allen, & Seegan, 2015). Davidson et al. (2009) 
suggested that since high-hope individuals likely have more goals and engage in more 
attempts to reach these, they also likely have more experience of failure and pain that 
contribute, through habituation, to acquired capability for suicide. This idea, however, 
has not been empirically tested and seems inadequate to explain the apparent connection 
between hope and acquired capability for suicide. An accurate understanding is important 
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so that treatment interventions with suicidal individuals target the appropriate factors. A 
fuller understanding of this phenomenon may lie with the concept of locus-of-hope, but 
to date no study has researched the relationship between external loci-of-hope and 
acquired capability for suicide. 
The purpose of this study was to contribute to the understanding of hope and 
suicidality by examining the relationship between external loci-of-hope (family, peers, 
spiritual factors) and acquired capability for suicide. I conjectured that only internally 
located hope—i.e., hope as defined by Snyder and colleagues (Snyder et al., 1991; 
Snyder, 2002)—is directly related to acquired capability for suicide, but that all three 
external loci-of-hope are inversely related to acquired capability for suicide. 
The remainder of this chapter includes an exhaustive review of the literature 
related to hope theory as defined by Snyder (Snyder et al., 1991), the interpersonal theory 
of suicide as formulated by Joiner (2005) and colleagues (Van Orden et al., 2010), and 
the relationship between the two. The chapter continues with my identification of an 
important gap in the literature revealed by this review and my explanation of how the 
present study was intended to fill that gap. The chapter concludes with a brief description 
of the methodology to be set forth more thoroughly in Chapter 3. 
Literature Search Strategy 
For this review, I searched the literature for published studies and theoretical 
works about hope, the interpersonal theory of suicide, and the bearing of the former on 
the latter. In particular, I sought material on the relationship between the locus-of-hope 
construct and the interpersonal theory of suicide. I used two primary methods of data 
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collection: electronic databases and the ancestry approach (in which earlier work is 
located through citations in subsequent material). In searching for current research, I used 
a third strategy: the descendancy approach (in which electronic databases are queried for 
later material that cites to a relevant source). As a first step, I conducted three searches 
using a proprietary university search tool that searches 63 separate databases spanning the 
gamut of academic and research literature. In the first, I used the key words locus of 
hope; in the second, the keywords locus of hope AND interpersonal theory of suicide OR 
interpersonal psychological theory of suicid*; in the third search, I used the same 
keywords as in the second, except the word hope was substituted for locus of hope. The 
first search yielded results in the following databases (in order of relevance): PsycINFO, 
Social Sciences Citation Index, Cochrane Central Register of Controlled Trials, 
MEDLINE with Full Text, and PsycTESTS. The second search yielded no results. The 
third search yielded results in the following databases (in order of relevance): PsycINFO, 
MEDLINE with Full Text, Social Sciences Citation Index, Health and Psychosocial 
Instruments, CINAHL Plus with Full Text, Education Source, Expanded Academic 
ASAP, ERIC, SocINDEX with Full Text, and Science Citation Index. I then individually 
searched the databases identified as containing pertinent literature, using subject-specific 
search options and limiters to exclude irrelevant material. For example, in PsycINFO the 
“Subjects” field was selected when inputting the search terms. No date range was 
specified in any searches, and “Full Text” was unchecked, to include the broadest range 
of results. This overall strategy thus accessed the full scope of seminal and current 
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literature, including peer-reviewed and gray (e.g., dissertations, unpublished studies) 
literature. 
The Construct of Hope 
First appearing around the year 888, the word “hope” existed in English long 
before researchers began examining it as a psychological construct (Hope, n.d.). 
Consequently, a body of literature exists in which hope is associated with various positive 
outcomes (e.g., Gottschalk, 1985 [influence on the immune system];  Herth, 1990 
[meaning for terminally-ill patients]; Korner, 1970 [necessary coping mechanism]; 
Menninger, 1959 [importance during times of suffering and loss]) without necessarily 
agreeing on a common, operationalized definition of the term. Most English-speakers 
understood: hope is good. 
But how good? And good for what? 
To meaningfully answer these questions—to have a scientific, useful 
understanding of hope—it was necessary to arrive at a common definition of the 
construct of hope and, based on that, to develop and validate an instrument for measuring 
that construct. Only then could researchers study not only whether people have hope, but 
also how much hope they have and the effects of various events or interventions on their 
levels of hope. 
Hope as a Curative Factor 
Early scholarly attention to hope, such as that mentioned above, was concentrated 
in the nursing and health care literature and tended to focus on hope as a factor in the care 
of elderly and ill (especially terminally ill) patients.  
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For example, Dufault and Martocchio (1985) proposed a complex theoretical 
model of hope based on research with elderly cancer patients. Herth (1992) used this 
model to construct the Herth Hope Index (HHI), an instrument “designed specifically for 
use in the clinical setting” (p. 1252). Herth’s stated goal for the HHI was to aid nurses 
and other clinicians in formulating hope-enhancing strategies for use with patients. In the 
realm of psychopathology, Erickson, Post, and Paige (1975) developed their Hope Scale 
to empirically confirm Stotland's (1969) theory that hope is a factor of perceived 
importance of a goal and perceived probability of attaining that goal, and that the lower 
the perceived probability of goal attainment and the higher the importance of the goal, the 
greater the anxiety and likelihood of psychopathology. Erickson et al. (1975) concluded 
that “effective treatment serves to increase the perceived probability of goal attainment” 
(p. 330). 
Despite the potential utility of such research in clinical settings, definitional issues 
and lack of demonstrated generalizability to nonpatient populations prevented such 
efforts from being viewed as capturing the full construct, prompting Staats to observe, 
“Empirical studies of hope are virtually nonexistent” (1987, p. 357). 
Hope: Affect or Cognition? 
Staats and Stassen (1985) recognized that hope as a general construct involves 
elements of both desire and expectation; one “hopes” for something one not only expects 
but also wants. They therefore termed hope an “affective cognition” (p. 235), and 
developed separate instruments to measure the affective (Staats, 1987; Staats & Stassen, 
1985) and cognitive (Staats, 1989; Staats & Stassen, 1986) components. 
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Not all theorists agreed with this dual characterization. Before the research 
community eventually settled on a dominant theory of hope (described below), scholars 
also argued that hope is either mainly cognitive or mainly affective. Taking the affective 
view, for example, and mirroring the earlier characterization of Staats and Stassen 
(1985), Averill, Catlin, and Chon (1990) labeled hope “an emotion of the mind” (p. 37) 
because it is a feeling that (in accordance with their social-constructionist view of 
emotion) is “structured according to social norms or rules” (p. 8). Lopez, Snyder, and 
Teramoto Pedrotti (2003) provide a concise yet thorough overview of the evolving 
conceptualization of hope. 
Snyder and the Development of Hope Theory 
Snyder (1994) believed existing definitions of hope lacked sufficient precision to 
be scientifically useful. He wrote: 
From my earliest days in thinking about hope, I have struggled with its clouded, 
rather vague definition. A new view of hope is needed as we enter the twenty-first 
century. My belief is that hope is a specific way of thinking about oneself rather 
than some nebulous, immeasurable philosophical notion. (p. 25) 
Thus, Snyder (1994) conceived of hope as primarily cognitive (see also Snyder, 
2002, p. 249), and specific enough (“a specific way of thinking about oneself”) to be 
measurable. Though also cognitive, he viewed Stotland’s (1969) earlier theory of hope as 
an incomplete account of the goal-seeking process; likewise, Snyder rejected Averill, 
Catlin, and Chon’s (1990) theory because it did not “lend itself as easily to measurement” 
(Snyder, 1995, p. 356). In what has come to be known simply as hope theory (Snyder, 
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2002), Snyder defined hope in terms of two components as applied to a third: agency 
thought (willpower) and pathways thought (waypower), as these relate to the attainment 
of goals. 
Agency thought (willpower). Snyder et al. (1991) viewed hope as “fueled by the 
perception of successful agency related to goals.…a sense of successful determination in 
meeting goals” (p. 570). This is “a reservoir of determination and commitment that we 
can call upon to help move us in the direction of the goal.…[and] is made up of thoughts 
such as I can, I’ll try, I’m ready to do this, and I’ve got what it takes [sic]” (Snyder, 1994, 
p. 6). Simply put, agency thought is “the perceived capacity to use one’s pathways to 
reach desired goals—[it] is the motivational component in hope theory” (Snyder, 2002, p. 
251). Snyder (1994) made a point of adding that, while one can have willpower without 
ever having experienced adversity, it is enhanced by a person’s knowledge that he or she 
has previously been confronted with obstacles and has nevertheless “been able to 
generate the mental efforts required to overcome them” (p. 7). 
Pathways thought (waypower). Snyder et al. (1991) also believed hope is 
“influenced by the perceived availability of successful pathways related to goals. The 
pathways component refers to a sense of being able to generate successful plans to meet 
goals” (p. 570). It is “a mental capacity we can call on to find one or more effective ways 
to reach our goals” (Snyder, 1994, p. 8). Thus, pathways thought involves both the 
subjective conviction that there must be a way and the objective ability to come up with a 
way. Accordingly, high-hope people give themselves messages like, “‘I’ll find a way to 
get this done!’.…[and] describe themselves as being flexible thinkers who are facile at 
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finding alternate routes…; moreover, high-hope people actually are very effective at 
producing alternative routes” (Snyder, 2002, p. 251). As with willpower, Snyder (1994) 
asserted waypower “probably” (p. 9) is enhanced by the experience of having 
successfully generated alternative pathways in the face of past obstacles. 
It is important to note that in Snyder’s conception, pathways and agency thought 
are not one-time factors that play their role and become moot until the next goal comes 
along. Rather, even within a single goal pursuit, they are reciprocal and iterative. In other 
words, it is not the case that a person will, for example, perceive multiple pathways 
toward a goal; become motivated (agentic) to pursue that goal; and then pursue the goal 
until it is either achieved or not. Instead, at every step along the way the person will 
continually reappraise his or her perception of available pathways, which reappraisal will 
in turn affect motivation. Alternatively, the person may become more or less motivated at 
some point along the way and this will affect his or her perception of whether alternative 
pathways are really viable. Throughout goal-directed behavior, hope reflects the 
cumulative effect of these ongoing iterations (Snyder et al., 1991). 
Goals. According to Snyder (1994), “goals are any objects, experiences, or 
outcomes that we imagine and desire in our minds” (p. 5), whether concrete or vague, 
short term or long term. They can be either positive—something we want to happen—or 
negative—something we want to prevent from happening (Snyder et al., 1991). 
Nevertheless, “we need only concern ourselves with goals of some magnitude or 
importance when it comes to hope. It seems foolish, for example, to assert, ‘I hope to put 
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on my shoes’” (p. 5). Like Averill, Catlin, and Chon (1990), Snyder initially believed 
only certain goals were includable in hope theory: 
Neither a goal you have no chance of obtaining nor one you are absolutely certain 
of meeting is part of hope as I am defining it. Why? If the probabilities of getting 
your desired goal are truly 0 percent or 100 percent, the outcomes are so 
overdetermined that hopeful thoughts are irrelevant. My conclusion, therefore, is 
that the goals involving hope fall somewhere between an impossibility and a sure 
thing. (Snyder, 1994, p. 6) 
In time, however, Snyder revised his thinking: “Over time…I have changed my 
views so as to include very high or very low probability goals as being appropriate targets 
for hoping” (2002, p. 250). This, he stated, was because observation of and conversation 
with high-hope people revealed that when pursuing easy, “sure thing” goals they tended 
to challenge themselves by self-imposing more difficult rules, such as shorter time limits. 
Conversely, Snyder reported noticing that even when a task seems impossible, high-hope 
people seem able to broaden their conceptions about what is possible in order to approach 
the task. Snyder concluded that the construct of hope is implicated even with very high or 
very low probability goals. 
It is interesting to note that Snyder and his colleagues saw shared goals as the 
foundation of group hope (Snyder, Cheavens, & Sympson, 1997). 
Developmental origins of hope. If, as Snyder contended, hope is primarily a 
state of mind, an outlook with respect to goals, one may legitimately ask how one 
acquires such a mindset. Why do some people seem naturally to be high in hope and 
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others low? Snyder (1994; Snyder, Cheavens, & Sympson, 1997) traced the development 
of pathways and agency thought to earliest childhood. He argued that as an infant learns 
to sense and perceive things in its environment and form mental linkages between things 
or events, ultimately pointing to objects as a signal it wants them, the child has laid the 
groundwork for pathways thought: the understanding that some things lead to others, and 
that it is possible to obtain desired objects—goals—by taking certain actions, such as 
pointing. Likewise, Snyder contended, when a child comes to recognize him- or herself 
as an independent entity and eventually to realize he or she is capable of instigating 
certain events or accomplishing certain tasks, he or she has formed the basis of agency 
thought. As noted above, Snyder believed these thought processes are reinforced if a 
child encounters obstacles to its goals but is able to overcome them. Because of the 
dependency of children on their caregivers to remove obstacles and otherwise facilitate 
goal pursuits, not to mention to provide a secure environment in which one thing 
dependably does lead to another, Snyder also included secure attachment to caregivers as 
important for the development of hope. As life experience accumulates throughout 
childhood, adolescence, and even into adulthood, a person’s mindset with respect to 
pathways and agentic thought is further shaped and reinforced. 
Role of emotion in hope theory. “Although there have been many writers,” 
wrote Snyder (2002, p. 252), “who have conceptualized hope solely as an emotion…, I 
have chosen to emphasize the thinking processes in hope theory.” Nevertheless, there can 
be no doubt that his thinking on the role of emotion evolved over the years. In their 
original formulation, Snyder et al. (1991) contended, “emotions are the sequelae of 
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cognitive appraisals of goal-related activities” (p. 571). They went on to explain that 
when people appraise their goal-related actions as likely to meet with success they 
experience positive emotions, while negative emotions result from the appraisal that their 
activities will likely fail. By the time of the statement quoted in the initial sentence of this 
paragraph, however, hope theory had broadened to accommodate a more active role for 
emotion. Specifically, this took two forms (Snyder, 2002): First, precisely because 
positive or negative emotions are the result of success or failure, respectively, at goal 
pursuits, as people move through life and learn positive or negative developmental 
lessons pertaining to the availability of pathways and their own agency, they develop 
positive or negative emotion sets that color their appraisal of prospective goal 
undertakings. That is, high hopers will tend to have positive emotions and be filled with 
zest and enthusiasm for new goal pursuits; the reverse will hold true for low hopers. 
Second, in the course of pursuing a goal a person will reevaluate his or her initial 
appraisal of the result based on how things appear to be going. Especially if obstacles are 
being encountered and how successfully they are being dealt with, this reappraisal will 
give rise to positive or negative emotions which will then feed back into the loop and 
affect how much enthusiasm and commitment will be applied to the person’s remaining 
efforts. 
Surprise events. The foregoing sequence has been described as a “typical goal-
pursuit ‘corridor’….[having] both feed-forward and feedback emotion-laden mechanisms 
that modulate the person’s success in attaining a given goal” (Lopez, Snyder, & 
Teramoto Pedrotti, 2003, p. 95). Most goals originate within this sequence or corridor, in 
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the sense that they are undertaken based on a person’s preexisting cognitive and 
emotional sets and the resulting appraisal of the given goal’s outcome value—its 
likelihood of success and whether it is worth the expected amount of effort. There is, 
however, a special case in which goals originate outside the typical corridor, namely, 
when surprise events arise. In that case, according to Snyder (2002), emotion is 
immediately generated because of the sheer contrast with the person’s ongoing 
circumstances. Surprise events could be positive (e.g., noticing a beautiful sunset) or 
negative (e.g., witnessing a car accident), and the emotion they engender is translated into 
motivation (agency). This is then joined with a goal and pathways appropriate to the 
situation, such as rushing to help the accident victims. Thus, although originating outside 
the typical goal-pursuit sequence, even surprise emotions are quickly incorporated 
therein. 
Hope Distinguished from Other Constructs 
Snyder (1991) recognized that his pathways and agency thought, which together 
form the basis of his model of hope, are very similar to the concepts of outcome and 
efficacy expectancies found in the motivational and personality literature. For example, 
in his seminal paper on self-efficacy, Bandura (1977) wrote: 
An outcome expectancy is defined as a person's estimate that a given behavior 
will lead to certain outcomes. An efficacy expectation is the conviction that one 
can successfully execute the behavior required to produce the outcomes. Outcome 
and efficacy expectations are differentiated, because individuals can believe that a 
particular course of action will produce certain outcomes, but if they entertain 
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serious doubts about whether they can perform the necessary activities such 
information does not influence their behavior. (p. 193) 
It will be readily seen, as Snyder (1991) himself conceded, that “efficacy and 
outcome expectancies, respectively, parallel the agency and pathways components of the 
present hope model” (p. 571). He therefore set out to distinguish his model of hope from 
other constructs that are based on these two expectancies. 
Optimism. One concept that appears similar to hope is optimism. This has been 
explicated in two major theories, each of which was addressed by Snyder. 
Scheier and Carver. Scheier and Carver (1985) maintained that dispositional 
optimism is a function of a person’s generalized outcome expectancy, i.e., not with 
respect to a specific task but about life at large. Snyder (1995) agreed “hope theory is 
similar to [Scheier and Carver’s theory of] optimism in that both are cognitive, cross-
situational, and both have brief, valid measurement instruments” (p. 356). However, he 
asserted, by focusing primarily on outcome expectancies (which parallel his concept of 
pathways thought), Scheier and Carver’s optimism omits the important efficacy (agency) 
component which, according to Snyder, operates in a reciprocal relationship with 
pathways thought to jointly determine level of hope. 
Learned optimism. According to Seligman (1998), pessimism and optimism are 
functions of a person’s explanatory style. Pessimists tend to attribute bad events to 
universal, permanent causes, such that if one bad thing happens it is a sign things are bad 
in general and will always be that way. By contrast, optimists attribute bad events to 
specific, temporary causes: if a bad thing happens, it is due to a specific reason that may 
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not apply in other areas and may not persist for long. Although Snyder agreed “both 
theories are cognitive and cross-situational in their emphases” (1995, p. 356), he felt hope 
is more than simply distancing oneself from failures. Instead, for Snyder, “hope is the 
essential process of linking oneself to potential success” (1994, p. 18). 
(It is interesting to note that, for his part, Seligman viewed hope as dependent on 
optimism. He observed, “Whether or not we have hope depends on two dimensions of 
our explanatory style: pervasiveness and permanence. Finding temporary and specific 
causes for misfortune is the art of hope” [1998, p. 48].) 
Self-efficacy. Bandura (1977) proposed self-efficacy—“the strength of people's 
convictions in their own effectiveness” (p. 193)—as the major determinant of behavior. 
Although he acknowledged the role of both outcome and efficacy expectancies, Bandura 
contended the latter factor was the more important. Similar to his position on Scheier and 
Carver’s (1985) optimism, therefore, Snyder (1995) felt self-efficacy theory was 
inadequate to fully explain behavior because it overlooks the necessary role of pathways 
thought (outcome expectancy) as it iteratively interacts with agency (efficacy). 
Furthermore, Bandura held efficacy expectancies are situation specific; they concern 
one’s belief in one’s effectiveness at a contemplated task. Hope theory, by contrast, is 
cross-situational. Snyder (1995) did see the theories as similar in that both are cognitive 
in orientation. 
Self-esteem. Snyder (2002) also differentiated hope from self-esteem. He pointed 
out that although self-esteem is implicitly based (like hope) on goal-directed thinking 
about important activities—with self-esteem being the result of success at those 
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important goals—hope theory focuses on the goal-pursuit process itself, rather than the 
feeling one gets from success. 
Problem solving. Finally, Snyder (2002) noted that the identification of a desired 
and important goal is “at the heart of problem-solving theory” (p. 258), which 
emphasizes uncovering the pathway to a solution. Despite these similarities to hope 
theory, however, the latter is distinctly different in that “in hope theory the agency 
thinking supposedly provides the motivation to activate pathways thinking (problem 
solving); as such, agency thought is emphasized and explicit” (p. 258). 
Response expectancies. The foregoing discussion has focused on hope and 
related constructs and their role in the production of behavior, such as whether a person 
high in hope, optimism, etc. will be more or less likely to do something. Another area of 
inquiry has concerned itself with nonvolitional outcomes, that is, those that do not depend 
on a person’s decision to undertake or abstain from an activity. An example would be the 
experience of pain or nausea in connection with a medical treatment: whether one does or 
does not experience such an outcome may be affected by a number of factors including 
one’s hopes and expectations (response expectancies) concerning the outcome. 
Montgomery, David, DiLorenzo, and Erblich (2003) investigated whether expectancy 
and hope are the same thing in the context of nonvolitional outcomes. Although 
correlated, they found significant differences between the two constructs. For example, 
Montgomery et al. (2003) found prior experience (e.g., whether in the past one has 
experienced nausea following the treatment) to influence response expectancy to a 
greater degree than that to which it influences hope. 
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Measuring Hope 
Snyder et al. (1991) were not content merely to delineate a new theory of hope. 
As Snyder later wrote, “Once a new psychological theory has been defined, a useful next 
step is to develop and validate an individual differences scale that reflects the theory 
structure” (2002, p. 255). Accordingly, Snyder et al. (1991) went on to develop and 
validate what they called at the time the Hope Scale, a 12-item self-report measure to be 
answered using a 4-point Likert-type scale (1 = definitely false, 2 = mostly false, 3 = 
mostly true, 4 = definitely true). Four of the items tap respondents’ agency thought (e.g., 
“I energetically pursue my goals” [p. 585]); four items tap pathways thought (e.g., “I can 
think of many ways to get out of a jam” [p. 585]); and four are fillers. Subscale scores 
can thus be derived by summing the agency and pathways items separately; the total hope 
score is derived by summing the eight agency and pathways items. When administering 
the measure, it is not labeled the Hope Scale but the Future Scale (Snyder, 1995). 
Trait Hope Scale. In the years following its original publication, the Hope Scale 
was refined into three separate instruments. Retaining its nature as a measure of overall, 
dispositional, hope, the original Hope Scale was renamed the Trait Hope Scale (Snyder, 
2002) or, alternatively, the Adult Dispositional Hope Scale (Lopez, Snyder, & Teramoto 
Pedrotti, 2003). An additional four response choices were added resulting in an 8-point 
scale (Snyder et al., 1996), but their use seems optional and their function is “to 
encourage more diversity in scores” (Lopez, Snyder, & Teramoto Pedrotti, 2003, p. 105). 
State Hope Scale. A State Hope Scale was also developed, because: 
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People probably have dispositional hope that applies across situations and times, 
but they also have state hope that reflects particular times and more proximal 
events. State hope, as measured in a given moment, provides a snapshot of a 
person's current goal-directed thinking. 
 Theoretically, dispositional hope should relate to the intensity of state 
hope by setting a band or range within which state hope varies. (Snyder et al., 
1996, p. 321) 
The State Hope Scale comprises three agency and three pathways items answered 
on an 8-point scale. Like the Trait Hope Scale, it yields agency and pathways subscores 
and an overall hope score by summing the applicable items. When administering this 
measure, it is called the Goals Scale for the Present (Snyder, 2002). 
Children’s Hope Scale. Finally, for children ages 8–16, Snyder et al. (1997) 
developed the Children’s Hope Scale, with three agency and three pathways items 
answered on a 6-point scale. When administered, it is labeled Questions About Your 
Goals. 
Other hope measures. Several specialized measures of hope have also been 
constructed:  
Domain-Specific Hope Scale. A Domain-Specific Hope Scale has been 
developed, measuring hope as manifest in six specific life domains: Social Relationships, 
Academics, Romantic Relationships, Family Life, Work, and Leisure Activities 
(Sympson, 1999). In each of the six domains, the original eight items of the Trait Hope 
Scale were modified so as to apply to the particular domain. For example, for the Social 
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Relationships scale, the item “I can think of many ways to get out of a jam” (Snyder et 
al., 1991, p. 585) was modified to read “I can think of many ways to make friends” 
(Sympson, 1999, p. 70). Domain-specific scores (Social Hope, Academic Hope, etc.) and 
a total Domain-Specific Hope score are obtained by summing the relevant subscale items 
and all 48 items respectively. 
Goal-Specific Hope Scale. Similarly, Feldman, Rand, and Kahle-Wrobleski 
(2009) constructed a Goal-Specific Hope Scale for the purpose of measuring hope about 
specific goals at specific points in time. Participants first identify a goal; then, with 
reference to that particular goal, answer six questions (three pertaining to agency and 
three to pathways) using an 8-point scale. Items were taken from the Trait Hope Scale 
and modified so as to apply to the particular goal. For example, “I energetically pursue 
my goals” was changed to “I energetically pursue this goal” (Feldman, Rand, & Kahle-
Wrobleski, 2009, p. 484). 
Young Children’s Hope Scale and Young Children’s Hope Scale—Modified. 
Snyder et al. (1997) developed the Children’s Hope Scale for children 8 or older because 
“although agency and pathways thoughts about goals should be relatively stable by the 
toddler years, children this young do not have the language skills to respond to a self-
report instrument” (p. 402). In an attempt to measure hope in children as young as 4, 
Berkich (1995) developed the Young Children’s Hope Scale, which involved presenting 
children with a series of scenarios with drawings portraying a high-hope and low-hope 
peer and asking them “Which child is most like you?” Bamford and Lagattuta (2012) 
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devised the Young Children’s Hope Scale—Modified, using simplified wording and a 
pictorial response scale to make the test even more accessible to young children. 
Non-self-report measures. In addition to all the above, measures of hope have 
been devised based on observer rating rather than self-report, or on analysis of an 
individual’s speech or writing (Lopez, Snyder, & Teramoto Pedrotti, 2003). 
Other than certain non-self-report measures, all the above instruments are based 
not only on hope theory as espoused by Snyder et al. (1991), but on the validated Hope 
Scale introduced therein. Indeed, the existence and sound psychometric properties of the 
Hope Scale and its derivatives are a large part of the reason Snyder’s hope theory has 
been so well accepted. As Bernardo (2010) wrote, “Hope theory research has been 
bolstered by the availability of a reliable self-report measure called the Dispositional 
Hope Scale (Snyder et al., 1991)….The instrument has allowed research to measure the 
relationship of hope with important positive processes and outcomes” (p. 944). 
The psychometric properties of the hope instrument used in this study will be 
more fully elaborated in Chapter 3. 
Benefits of Hope 
Hope has been shown to have positive effects in a number of important areas. 
Some examples follow: 
Academic performance. Feldman, Davidson, and Margalit (2015) administered a 
brief hope intervention patterned after that of Feldman and Dreher (2012), described 
below, to 83 first-year college students in Israel. Using a Hebrew adaptation of the State 
Hope Scale, participants’ levels of state hope were measured at three points in time 
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commencing with the start of the intervention. Students’ grades were obtained for the 
semesters six months before the intervention, one week before the intervention, and two 
months following the intervention. These authors found “students who reported high 
levels of hope at Time 3 reached better average grades at the end of the year….even 
though their grades were not different before the workshop” (p. 555). 
Feldman and Kubota (2015) argued that “most past work has documented 
relatively weak relationships between GPA and hope, possibly because hope has been 
measured in a general way rather than a way specific to academic goals” (p. 212). They 
therefore reexamined this relationship using the academic subscale of the Domain-
Specific Hope Scale in a sample of 89 college students at a Northern California university 
and found, as hypothesized, that “generalized hope predicted academic hope, and 
academic hope in turn directly predicted GPA” (p. 214). 
Athletics. Curry, Snyder, Cook, Ruby, and Rehm (1997) used the Trait Hope 
Scale to measure hope in National Collegiate Athletic Association (NCAA) Division I 
track athletes at the beginning of the season, and had coaches rate the athletes’ natural 
abilities. High-hope athletes performed significantly better than those with low hope, 
even after controlling for natural ability. In a related study of female track athletes, Curry 
et al. (1997) found that together, trait and state hope (measured before each performance 
using the State Hope Scale) significantly predicted sport performance, and accounted for 
about 56% of the variance related to performance. What is more, no other psychological 
variable measured (self-esteem, confidence, and mood) contributed significant variance 
to the predictions. 
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Gustafsson, Skoog, Podlog, Lundqvist, and Wagnsson (2013) investigated the 
relationship between trait hope and burnout in elite junior soccer players. They 
administered a Swedish translation of the Trait Hope Scale and measures of perceived 
stress, positive and negative affect, and athlete burnout (conceptualized in terms of 
emotional/physical exhaustion, reduced sense of accomplishment, and sport devaluation) 
to 238 Swedish soccer players aged 15–19 enrolled in that country’s national sports 
program. Consistent with prior research showing a negative correlation between hope and 
sports burnout, these authors found “hope as an enduring trait is associated with low 
athlete burnout” (p. 646) because high-hope individuals tend to have less stress and more 
positive affect, which mediate the relationship. 
Work. There have been numerous studies of hope as it relates to the workplace. 
In a meta-analysis of 133 effect sizes across 45 primary studies based on 11,139 
employees, Reichard, Avey, Lopez, and Dollwet (2013) “examine[d] the relationship 
between hope and a number of indicators and counterindicators of employee happiness 
and well-being, including job satisfaction, organizational commitment, employee health, 
well-being, burnout, and stress” (p. 292). They found not only do high-hope employees 
perform better than their low-hope counterparts, they also “exhibit more desirable 
behaviors, and display more positive attitudes” (p. 302). 
Physical health. In an effort to develop an intervention addressing the 
circumstances and stressors unique to those with recurrence (as opposed to initial 
diagnosis) of cancer, Thornton et al. (2014) tested a treatment comprising mindfulness, 
biobehavioral components (“understanding one’s stress response, information seeking, 
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social support, assertive communication, sexuality, and health behaviors,” p. 1091), and 
Hope Therapy as manualized by Cheavens, Feldman, Gum, Michael, and Snyder (2006), 
described below. Thirty-two women (mostly Caucasian and with a mean age of 58) with 
recurrent breast or gynecologic cancers were provided 20 treatment sessions in individual 
or group formats. As measured by the State Hope Scale, results showed the pathways (but 
not agency) component of hope increased significantly over the seven-month course of 
treatment, and total state hope score was negatively related to depression, negative mood, 
worry, and symptoms of generalized anxiety disorder. The treatment as a whole 
(including all three components) decreased distress, anxiety, and negative affect, while 
increasing positive affect and mental-health-related quality-of-life. 
Griggs and Walker (2016) conducted an integrative review of 54 studies on the 
role of hope for adolescents with a chronic illness. They identified seven areas in which 
hope is beneficial in this population, including that it promotes health and is an important 
factor in resilience. For example, hopefulness was significantly correlated with positive 
health practices, adherence to medication regimen, and remaining in treatment. 
Psychological adjustment. Citing the American Psychological Association's 
(2014) Guidelines for Prevention in Psychology, Kwon, Birrueta, Faust, and Brown 
(2015) point out that “prevention is more effective when it enhances strengths, rather than 
merely reducing risk factors” (p. 697). Accordingly, these authors studied the role of 
hope in preventive interventions, and found it to be an important strength “clearly shown 
to mitigate the negative impact of stressors and other risk factors for psychological 
distress” (p. 710). 
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Psychotherapy. Psychotherapy clients begin treatment with certain outcome 
expectancies, that is, beliefs about whether they will see improvement as a result of the 
therapy. In an attempt to better understand the relationship of such outcome expectancies 
to actual outcome, Aubuchon-Endsley, Callahan, González, Ruggero, and Abramson 
(2015) examined hope as a mediator between these two variables. In a study of 112 
Brazilian men and women using Portuguese translations of the State and Trait Hope 
Scales, they found that “hope…significantly explains associations between treatment 
expectations and outcomes. Therefore, treatment techniques that bolster hope should be 
considered…when clients are experiencing low treatment expectations” (p. 76). 
Hope itself is malleable; it can be increased by therapeutic intervention. 
Cheavens, Feldman, Gum, Michael, and Snyder (2006) developed an 8-session group 
therapy protocol they termed “Hope Therapy,” designed to increase hope in pursuit of 
benefits such as those outlined above. Hope Therapy increased the agency component of 
hope, as well as life meaning and self-esteem, and it reduced symptoms of depression and 
anxiety. Feldman and Dreher (2012) took this one step further. They introduced a single 
90-minute intervention that increased hope in the short term (between pre- and post-test) 
and predicted greater levels of progress toward goals one month later. 
Extending Hope Theory: Locus-of-Hope 
It is apparent from all the foregoing that hope theory as set forth by Snyder et al. 
(1991) has become the cornerstone for research done in the field over the past 25 years. 
Yet there is a glaring omission in Snyder’s formulation that has gone unaddressed until 
recently. It will be recalled that Snyder conceptualized hope as a combination of a 
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person’s belief that there are many ways for him or her to reach a goal (pathways 
thought) and the person’s sense that he or she has the capability and determination to 
reach the goal (agency thought). The shortcoming of this formulation is it includes only 
goals pursued exclusively by the hopeful person. This is at odds with lived experience, 
which teaches us that statements like, “I hope Grandma comes to my party”; “I hope it 
doesn’t rain on the picnic”; and “I hope the Yankees win” are well within the legitimate 
bounds of hope. None of these things are determined by a person’s ability to find 
alternative means to an end or by his or her own sense of agency. 
Ironically, Snyder et al. (1991) seemed to recognize this in the very article 
delineating hope theory—although in the context of Bandura’s theory of self-efficacy 
rather than hope. They wrote: 
Scheier and Carver (1987) are critical of Bandura's reliance on efficacy rather 
than outcome expectancies, stressing that personal efficacy expectancies cannot 
account for outcomes that are based on forces that are beyond the control of the 
person (e.g., religious faith, luck, or interventions from powerful others). (p. 572) 
Be that as it may, Bernardo (2010) addressed this omission as applied to hope, 
extending hope theory to include agents other than the hoping person, as well as plans or 
strategies (pathways) generated by such external agents. Bernardo defined the construct 
of locus-of-hope. He called what Snyder and his colleagues described in the hope theory 
literature internal locus-of-hope, because it involved a person’s own pathways and 
agency thought. By contrast, Bernardo said, there is also external locus-of-hope, which 
includes three subdimensions based on the contributions to goal attainment of family, 
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peers, and supernatural/spiritual beings or forces; these three subdimensions are 
designated external–family, external–peers, and external–spiritual, respectively. Because 
each of these areas has been associated with subjective well-being, it has been suggested 
that locus-of-hope as a whole may be an important predictor of subjective well-being 
(Garcia & Sison, 2013). 
Measuring Locus-of-Hope 
To validate the above four locus-of-hope dimensions, Bernardo (2010) developed 
the Locus-of-Hope Scale (also known as the Locus-of-Hope Questionnaire), a new 
measure based on Snyder’s Trait Hope Scale. With the exception of three minor 
rewordings (e.g., to make an American expression more understandable to Filipino 
participants), the original eight hope items (four tapping pathways thought and four 
agentic thought) of the Trait Hope Scale were retained verbatim as the internal locus-of-
hope subscale of the new instrument. The other three subscales—external–family, 
external–peers, and external–spiritual—were constructed by modifying the original eight 
items to reflect the particular locus-of-hope being measured. For example, in the internal 
subscale, one agency item is “I meet the goals that I set for myself”; in the external–
family subscale, one pathways item is “My family has lots of ways of helping me attain 
my goals”; in the external–peers subscale, one agency item is “I have been able to meet 
my goals because of my friends’ help”; and in the external–spiritual subscale, one 
pathways item says G-d “has many different ways of letting me attain my goals” (p. 946). 
The wording and/or instructions section of external–spiritual subscale items is intended to 
be adapted as appropriate to the spiritual or cultural beliefs of the participants; for 
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example, references to G-d may be replaced by such terms as fate, a higher power, or 
specific deity names (A. B. I. Bernardo, personal communication, July 18, 2016). Each 
item is answered on a 4-point scale. Including eight filler items, the Locus-of-Hope Scale 
thus consists of 40 items and can yield a total score as well as four subscale scores 
obtained by totaling the relevant items. 
Because it includes the Trait Hope Scale virtually verbatim but captures a more 
comprehensive picture of hope, the Locus-of-Hope Scale was used in this study. Its 
psychometric properties will be more fully elaborated in Chapter 3. 
Research on Locus-of-Hope 
The locus-of-hope construct has proven useful in recent research on hope in 
various contexts, offering deeper and more precise understanding of the mechanics of 
hope. For example, researchers using the Locus-of-Hope Scale (or a shortened, Filipino-
language version thereof) have been able to investigate the relationship between specific 
external loci-of-hope and dimensions of wellbeing such as optimism, self-esteem, and life 
satisfaction (Bernardo & Estrellado, 2014; Du, Bernardo, & Yeung, 2015; Du & King, 
2013). Likewise, Bernardo & Nalipay (2016) used the locus-of-hope construct to 
investigate the antecedents of hope, suggesting various social axioms or beliefs about life 
may engender specific loci-of-hope. 
Bernardo & Estrellado (2015) found battered women in a collectivist society such 
as that of the Philippines were more likely to intend to seek help if they had external-peer 
locus-of-hope than if they had external–family locus-of-hope, and that such women were 
less likely to intend to seek help if they had external–spiritual locus-of-hope. 
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Bernardo (2015) confirmed the validity of the Locus-of-Hope Scale with early 
adolescents, using a sample of 825 Filipino children aged 12–15. In doing so, he was able 
to detect developmental differences with respect to loci-of-hope: external–family and 
external–spiritual loci-of-hope were found to be more prominent than internal or 
external–peers loci-of-hope, although internal and external–spiritual loci-of-hope 
increased in the 14–15-year-olds. 
Bernardo, Salanga, Khan, & Yeung (2016) demonstrated the relevance of locus-
of-hope to student learning strategies: university students with internal locus-of-hope 
were more likely to use individual cognitive strategies like rehearsal, elaboration, and 
organization; whereas those with external–peers locus-of-hope were more inclined 
toward spontaneous collaborative learning strategies like sharing study materials or 
forming study groups. 
Finally, Datu & Mateo (2017) hypothesized that in a collectivist society such as 
that of the Philippines, external loci-of-hope would moderate the effects of discrimination 
on well-being outcomes. They found that although external–family and external–spiritual 
loci-of-hope did not appear to moderate that relationship, external–peers locus-of-hope 
did, suggesting support from peers in particular can be a potent buffer against the 
negative effects of discrimination. 
Summary of Hope 
As originally conceived by Snyder et al. (1991), hope theory can be summarized 
as follows: “Hope = Mental Willpower + Waypower for Goals….Simply put, hope 
reflects a mental set in which we have the perceived willpower and the waypower to get 
45 
 
to our destination” (Snyder, 1994, p. 10). Hope theory has grown to accommodate a role 
for emotion, in that attainment or nonattainment of a goal generates positive or negative 
emotion, respectively, which then influences how one views one’s pathways and agency 
with respect to that goal in the future. The concept of locus-of-hope extends hope theory 
to include agency and pathways of people or forces beyond the hoping person, allowing a 
truer portrayal of hope as actually experienced. 
The theoretical and research literature on hope supports the conclusion that it is an 
important construct for the understanding of human activity, the effects of which are seen 
in areas as diverse as academic achievement, sports performance, work, physical health, 
and psychological well-being. Hope is a discrete entity, related to but distinct from 
optimism, self-efficacy, and similar psychological constructs. Moreover, hope can be 
measured and, if low, increased through therapeutic intervention, facilitating 
improvement in manifold domains of life. 
The literature makes clear that hope is well worth considering for potential 
relevance to suicidality, and several studies have done just that. The results of this line of 
inquiry will be considered after a discussion of suicidality itself. 
Suicidality 
Every year, more than 800,000 people worldwide die due to suicide (World 
Health Organization [WHO], 2016). This problem is greatly magnified in light of 
indications that for every adult suicide death, over 20 additional people may have 
attempted suicide (WHO, 2016); this figure rises to as high as 25 in the United States 
(Drapeau & McIntosh, 2015). In the United States, there were 44,193 deaths by suicide in 
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2015; after unintentional injury, it was the leading cause of death for Americans between 
15 and 34 years of age (Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, 2016). 
Because of the importance of suicide as a public health problem (and no doubt 
also because of the tragic nature of the act) researchers have invested considerable time 
studying various aspects of the phenomenon. As a result, much information has been 
accumulated about suicide, but until recently there has been a shortage of theory to 
explain the diverse nature of what is known. For example, rather than being the same 
group of people considered at different points along the path toward suicide, research 
shows suicide attempters and suicide completers to be “two distinct populations that 
share certain characteristics” (Parra Uribe et al., 2013, p. 840). Indeed, the most recent 
data available indicate that each year, 3.3% of Americans seriously consider suicide; 
1.0% form a suicide plan; and 0.6% attempt suicide (Kessler, Berglund, Borges, Nock, & 
Wang, 2005). Yet only 0.01% of Americans actually die by suicide each year (Drapeau & 
McIntosh, 2015), highlighting the significant differences among these groups. What is it 
that differentiates those who complete the act of suicide from the much larger group of 
people who attempt it, and from the even larger group who only contemplate it? 
Another unexplained aspect of suicide is its gender distribution. In the United 
States in 2014, for example, male suicide deaths outnumbered female suicide deaths by a 
ratio of 3.4 to 1; paradoxically, though, female suicide attempts outnumbered male 
suicide attempts by a ratio of 3 to 1 (Drapeau & McIntosh, 2015). Simply put, 
substantially more females than males attempt to commit suicide, but substantially more 
males than females actually succeed. Why? 
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Furthermore, as O’Connor and Nock (2014) have pointed out: 
Although a range of risk factors for suicidal behaviour has been identified, how or 
why these factors work together to increase the risk of this behaviour is not clear. 
Perhaps the most widely studied risk factor for suicidal behaviour is the presence 
of a previous psychiatric disorder. Findings from psychological autopsy studies 
suggest that more than 90% of people who die by suicide have a psychiatric 
disorder before their death. On balance, however, most people with a psychiatric 
disorder never become suicidal (ie, [sic] experience suicidal thoughts, make 
suicide attempts, or die by suicide). (pp. 73–74) 
As another example, history of past attempts has been strongly associated with 
suicide, yet up to half of those who complete suicide do so on their first attempt 
(Cornaggia, Beghi, Rosenbaum, & Cerri, 2013). 
Ideally, a theory of suicide should account for these and other known facts about 
suicide, tying them together into a comprehensive explanation for the phenomenon. 
Theories of Suicide 
O’Connor and Nock (2014) provided a concise summary of 11 predominant 
models of suicidal behavior. Among the various explanations for suicide that have been 
proposed, they included such factors as hopelessness; defeat and a feeling of being 
trapped; unbearable psychological pain; and a need to escape. O’Connor and Nock 
asserted that “contemporary models of suicide are mostly diathesis stress in origin and 
cognitive in focus” (p. 74). They seemed to agree with Van Orden et al. (2010) that “each 
of these theories is able to explain [only] part of the landscape of suicidal behavior” (p. 
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580), and noted that in particular, only two theories they discussed address “why most 
people who have thoughts of suicide do not attempt suicide” (O’Connor & Nock, 2014, 
p. 74). These are Joiner’s (2005; Van Orden et al., 2010) interpersonal theory of suicide 
(IPTS) and O’Connor's (2011) integrated motivational-volitional model of suicidal 
behavior. This study was concerned with the former. 
Interpersonal Theory of Suicide 
As stated earlier, a theory of suicide should account for the diversity of known 
data about the phenomenon, tying them all together in a way that explains their 
interaction and plausibly predicts likely outcome under a variety of circumstances. Joiner 
(2005) made this claim for his interpersonal theory of suicide. 
Many prominent psychologists and others have considered psychological needs as 
a way to understand human motivation and human nature. Several lists of needs 
exist, and a premise associated with them is that people are highly motivated to 
meet these needs. When they do, the theory goes, well-being and health are 
achieved. Of course, the flipside to this is that frustrated needs can lead to an 
array of problems…. 
 …Models including as many as twenty needs pose a problem for a model 
of suicide based on needs. Given that there are so many needs and thus so many 
people with one or more thwarted needs, how to understand that very, very few of 
these people attempt suicide, and fewer still die by suicide?.... 
 My solution to this problem is to assert two bedrock needs, the fulfillment 
of which satisfies most others and can compensate for frustration of other needs. 
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The thwarting of both of these needs constitutes the desire for death. (Joiner, 
2005, pp. 95–96) 
Joiner (2005) identified these two superordinate human needs as the need to 
belong and the need to feel effective or competent. When the former is thwarted, he aptly 
termed this condition thwarted belongingness. As to the latter, Joiner asserted it becomes 
especially painful if the person perceives him- or herself to be so ineffective as to 
constitute a burden to others, especially loved ones. Joiner called this condition perceived 
burdensomeness, and together, these conditions comprise the first two prongs of his 
three-pronged theory. The real innovation, however, of the interpersonal theory of suicide 
lies in its third prong, which Joiner contended answers the question of why most people 
who want to die nevertheless do not kill themselves. After all, he pointed out, “the most 
basic instinct of all” (p. 46) is that of self-preservation, a supremely powerful force that, 
under most circumstances, simply will not permit a person to voluntarily engage in self-
destructive acts. Joiner posited that the human self-preservation instinct can be overcome 
through a process of habituation arising from prior exposure to painful or provocative 
events. He termed this crucial third prong acquired capability for suicide. The essence of 
the IPTS is that when thwarted belongingness, perceived burdensomeness, and the 
acquired capability for suicide are all present simultaneously, the person is at high risk 
for suicide. Each of the theory’s three prongs is examined in more detail below. 
Thwarted belongingness. Based on the earlier research of Baumeister and Leary 
(1995), Joiner (2005) concluded the need to belong consists of two factors: frequent, 
positive interactions with others; and a persistent feeling of being cared about. “People 
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seem to need frequent, affectively pleasant or positive interactions with the same 
individuals, and they need these interactions to occur in a framework of long-term, stable 
caring and concern” (Baumeister & Leary, 1995, p. 520). Stable relationships, Joiner 
said, are better for this purpose than relatively transient ones, and face-to-face 
interactions better than those not conducted in person. In their restatement of the IPTS, 
Joiner and his colleagues (Van Orden et al., 2010) termed absence of these factors—
comprising the two components of thwarted belongingness—loneliness and the absence 
of reciprocally caring relationships. 
In support of the relationship between thwarted belongingness and suicidality, 
Joiner (2005) cited a number of interesting examples. Perhaps most obvious is the fact 
that many suicide notes mention loss of a relationship as a reason for the suicide. Another 
example can be found in demographic risk factors for suicide, wherein nonmarried status 
elevates risk and divorced status especially so. Joiner conceded these statistics are open to 
several interpretations but suggested they are consistent with the idea that “belongingness 
(as indicated by married status) is a suicide buffer, whereas thwarted belongingness (as 
indicated by nonmarried status) is a risk for death by suicide” (p. 124). Joiner also called 
attention to the phenomenon of increased rates of suicidality among immigrants and 
others who had recently changed residence. He speculated this can be explained on the 
basis that leaving one’s country or former home constitutes a type of loss of 
belongingness. Conversely, Joiner pointed to research showing suicide rates tend to fall 
in times of national tragedy, and even (although perhaps on a more local level) when a 
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home sports team wins. He argued such events cause people to pull together, thereby 
increasing their sense of belongingness. 
Perceived burdensomeness. As noted above, perceived burdensomeness is the 
perception that one is a burden to “close others, including but not limited to family 
members” (Van Orden et al., 2010, p. 583). As was done with thwarted belongingness, 
Van Orden et al. (2010) posited two components of perceived burdensomeness: “beliefs 
that the self is so flawed as to be a liability on others and affectively laden cognitions of 
self-hatred” (p. 583). 
Van Orden et al. (2010) explained several facts about suicide on the basis of 
perceived burdensomeness. For example, they noted that family conflict, unemployment, 
and physical illness are all robustly associated with suicide; they proposed the “common 
thread” among these risk factors is their “elevated likelihood of developing perceptions of 
burdensomeness on others” (p. 583). Joiner (2005) again pointed to suicide notes, arguing 
many such notes contain the sentiment that survivors will be better off without the 
deceased. He also argued that modern and ancient cultures in which suicide is or was 
expected of the elderly or infirm so as not to burden society highlight the relationship 
between perceived burdensomeness and death. 
Joiner (2005) and his colleagues (Van Orden et al., 2010) stress it is the 
perception of burdensomeness, not necessarily the fact of burdensomeness, that is 
associated with suicidality. Joiner wrote, “I would like to emphasize the term 
perceived….It is very important to point out that their perceptions are mistaken. Indeed, 
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that their perceptions are mistaken is the basis for the psychotherapeutic treatment of 
suicidal symptoms” (pp. 98–99). 
Effect of thwarted belongingness and perceived burdensomeness: will to live 
versus passive suicidal ideation. Joiner (2005) appeared to believe in a basic human will 
to live, consonant with the self-preservation instinct referenced above. Accordingly, he 
described social connections (absence of thwarted belongingness) and a feeling of 
competence and effectiveness (absence of perceived burdensomeness) as protective 
factors against suicide. For example, Joiner wrote: 
Assuming the capability for suicide, perceived burdensomeness removes one of 
the two key barriers to suicide. Even for a person who has acquired the capability 
for suicide and perceives him- or herself to be a burden, there remains one 
“saving grace”—belongingness. In my view, if the need to belong is satisfied, the 
will to live remains intact. (p. 117) 
Van Orden at al. shifted away from this position in their reformulation of the 
IPTS in 2010. In that later writing, they asserted: 
Individuals who possess either complete thwarted belongingness or complete 
perceived burdensomeness will experience passive (versus active) suicidal 
ideation, which may manifest as cognitions such as “I wish I was dead” or “I 
would be better off dead.” In contrast, active suicidal ideation is marked by an 
active desire to engage in behaviors to take one’s life (e.g., “I want to kill 
myself”). (p. 588) 
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In the earlier formulation, a person will not want to commit suicide as long as he 
or she retains a sense of either connection or competence (i.e., as long as either thwarted 
belongingness or perceived burdensomeness is absent). In the later formulation, the 
person will experience passive suicidal ideation such as the wish to be dead as soon as 
either one of thwarted belongingness or perceived burdensomeness is present. 
Hopelessness about thwarted belongingness and perceived burdensomeness. 
According to Joiner (2005) and colleagues (Van Orden et al., 2010), thwarted 
belongingness and perceived burdensomeness do not contribute to desire for death unless 
one believes them to be stable and permanent conditions. Joiner (2005) gave the example 
of returning to a soccer team after being out due to injury and playing poorly, resulting in 
a feeling of burdensomeness to the team and disappointment on the part of its members. 
These feelings were insignificant, he stated, because of the expectation of improvement 
and return to baseline with continued practice. By contrast, “in order for active suicidal 
desire to develop, individuals must perceive their levels of belongingness and 
burdensomeness to be stable and permanent—in other words, they must be hopeless 
about their perceived interpersonal status” (Van Orden et al., 2010, p. 589).  
Van Orden et al. (2010) pointed out approximately 80% of those who engaged in 
serious suicidal behavior scored above the cutoff point on the Beck Hopelessness Scale 
(BHS; A T Beck, Weissman, Lester, & Trexler, 1974), indicating the presence of 
hopelessness. At the same time, however, nearly 60% of those who did not attempt 
suicide also scored above the cutoff point on the BHS, meaning most hopeless 
individuals will not die by suicide. Van Orden et al. explained this on the ground that “the 
54 
 
content of hopeless beliefs—what individuals are hopeless about—is relevant in the 
prediction of suicidal behavior” (p. 590). It is only, they contended, hopelessness about 
thwarted belongingness and perceived burdensomeness that will cause active suicidal 
desire. 
Acquired capability for suicide. The third and arguably pivotal prong of the 
IPTS is that although people may feel a desire for death, not many people have what it 
takes to kill themselves; this ability is acquired only through prior exposure to painful or 
provocative experiences (Joiner, 2005; Van Orden et al., 2010). More specifically, Joiner 
(2005) and colleagues (Van Orden et al., 2010) posited that two powerful, inborn factors 
make it virtually impossible to kill oneself under ordinary circumstances: fear of death 
and aversion to physical pain. Someone who has managed to overcome these two 
impediments—they assert—has acquired the capability for suicide. 
Joiner (2005) and colleagues (Van Orden et al., 2010) asserted these two factors 
are overcome via habituation and opponent processes. When a person has been exposed 
to painful or provocative experiences—including such diverse forms as prior suicide 
attempts, nonsuicidal self-injury such as cutting behaviors, combat service, status as a 
police officer or surgeon, or childhood abuse—he or she tends to habituate to fear of 
injury or death and also develops a higher tolerance for physical pain. Furthermore, 
opponent process theory (Solomon & Corbit, 1974) states observed emotional responses 
comprise both a primary and an opponent process, and that with repeated exposure the 
primary process remains stable and the opponent process strengthens. By way of 
example, Van Orden et al. (2010) stated: 
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An individual’s initial, primary response to a stimulus such as bungee jumping 
will likely be fear. However with repeated exposure to bungee jumping, the effect 
of the primary process (e.g., fear) will remain stable, whereas the effect of the 
opponent process (e.g., exhilaration) will become amplified, yielding a net 
observed emotional response of decreased fear. (pp. 586–587) 
The IPTS modifies Solomon and Corbit’s (1974) theory to stipulate that with 
repeated exposure to self-harm behaviors, the primary process weakens instead of 
remaining stable. According to the IPTS, “the primary effect of painful and provocative 
stimuli (e.g., self-harm) is fear and pain and…the opponent processes are relief and 
analgesia” (Van Orden et al., 2010, p. 587). Thus, as applied to acquired capability for 
suicide, the IPTS posits “through repeated practice, what was originally a painful and/or 
fear-inducing experience (i.e., self-injury) may become less frightening as well as a 
source of emotional relief, thereby rendering individuals capable of engaging in what 
were previously painful and frightening behaviors” (p. 587). 
Suicidal intent. In 2005, Joiner presented the above ideas as a fairly 
straightforward link between the desire for suicide (resulting from the combined presence 
of thwarted belongingness, perceived burdensomeness, and hopelessness as to both) and 
serious suicidal behavior (i.e., lethal or near-lethal suicide attempts). In another apparent 
refinement of the theory, Joiner and colleagues (Van Orden et al., 2010) interposed 
suicidal intent between suicidal desire and suicide attempt. They defined suicidal intent 
as “the level of suicidal desire that is most likely to translate into behavior” (p. 590), and 
posited: 
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In order to possess suicidal intent, individuals must have habituated to the fear 
involved in suicide to an extent that they are able to imagine, plan, or decide to 
engage in suicidal actions. Thus it is hypothesized…that the simultaneous 
presence of suicidal desire and the first component of acquired capability—
lowered fear of death—serves as the condition under which suicidal desire will 
transform into suicidal intent. (p. 590) 
Van Orden et al. (2010) went on to elaborate that the second component of 
acquired capability—elevated physical pain tolerance—moderates the causal path 
between suicidal intent and lethal or near-lethal suicide attempt. Thus, it is not until one 
has acquired reduced fear of death that one’s desire for death will turn into suicidal 
intent; and even then, it is not until one has acquired elevated physical pain tolerance that 
suicidal intent will express itself in the form of a lethal or near-lethal suicide attempt. 
This, contends the IPTS, accounts for the relative rarity of serious suicide attempts. 
Measuring Constructs of the Interpersonal Theory of Suicide 
A number of measuring instruments have been used in research involving the 
IPTS. The most important of these are briefly described below: 
Interpersonal Needs Questionnaire (INQ-15). The Interpersonal Needs 
Questionnaire (INQ-15; Van Orden, Cukrowicz, Witte, & Joiner, 2012) is a 15-item self-
report questionnaire designed to assess feelings of thwarted belongingness and perceived 
burdensomeness. Each item is answered on a 7-point Likert-type scale ranging from 1 
(“Not at all true for me”) to 7 (“Very true for me”). Six of the 15 items are reverse 
scored. Sample items are: “These days, I think my death would be a relief to the people in 
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my life” (perceived burdensomeness), and “These days, I am close to other people” 
(reverse scored; thwarted belongingness). 
Acquired Capability for Suicide Scale—Fearlessness About Death (ACSS-
FAD). The Acquired Capability for Suicide Scale—Fearlessness About Death (ACSS-
FAD; Ribeiro et al., 2014) was specifically developed from a former version in order to 
accommodate the 2010 refinements to the IPTS by Van Orden et al. The ACSS-FAD 
includes 7 self-report items answered on a 5-point Likert-type scale, ranging from 0 
(“Not at all like me”) to 4 (“Very much like me”). Three of the 7 items are reverse 
scored. Sample items are: “The pain involved in dying frightens me” (reverse scored) and 
“I am not disturbed by death being the end of life as I know it.” 
Painful and Provocative Events Scale (PPES). Bender, Gordon, Bresin, and 
Joiner (2011) described the Painful and Provocative Events Scale (PPES) as an 18-item 
self-report questionnaire designed to assess how many times participants have 
experienced the type of painful and provocative events germane to the IPTS, such as “got 
a piercing, shot a gun, intentionally hurt animals, played contact sport, in physical fights, 
victim of sexual abuse” (p. 303). The current version of the PPES has 26 items answered 
“Never,” “Once,” “2–3 times,” “4–20 times,” or “More than 20 times.” 
The psychometric properties of the INQ-15 and the ACSS-FAD, which were used 
in this study, will be discussed in Chapter 3. 
Research Support for the Interpersonal Theory of Suicide 
The explanatory power of the IPTS and its potential usefulness in guiding 
treatment have made the theory increasingly attractive since its relatively recent 
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publication. Following on the extensive and persuasive research of Joiner (2005) and 
colleagues (Van Orden et al., 2010), many other researchers have investigated questions 
involving the IPTS and found support for its conclusions. 
For example, Puzia, Kraines, Liu, and Kleiman (2014) studied 189 
undergraduates (84.2% female) with moderate to severe childhood abuse to determine 
whether thwarted belongingness and perceived burdensomeness mediated the relation 
between childhood emotional abuse and suicidal ideation. Participants completed 
measures of childhood abuse, thwarted belongingness, and perceived burdensomeness on 
a secure website, and seven weeks later completed a measure of suicidal ideation. These 
authors found, as hypothesized, that childhood emotional abuse (but not childhood 
physical or sexual abuse) was uniquely associated with suicidal ideation, and that this 
relationship was mediated by perceived burdensomeness. (Thwarted belongingness was 
found to be associated with childhood sexual abuse, but not to mediate its relationship 
with suicidal ideation.) This finding supports the idea that emotional abuse leads a child 
to feel unwanted and a burden on his or her family, which in turn gives rise to suicidal 
ideation. Interestingly, the researchers suggested that other forms of childhood abuse (i.e., 
physical and sexual abuse) are also uniquely associated with suicide risk, but through 
different pathways from that of emotional abuse: emotional abuse, they implied, leads to 
suicidal ideation, whereas physical and sexual abuse may constitute a form of painful and 
provocative experience that, according to the IPTS, confers acquired capability for 
suicide. 
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In another study involving the IPTS, Hames et al. (2015) examined intake data 
gathered from 415 adult outpatients at the Florida State University Psychology Clinic. 
The data included measures of thwarted belongingness and perceived burdensomeness 
(the Interpersonal Needs Questionnaire, described above), and “a four-item scale that 
measures the degree to which individuals seek reassurance from others” (Hames et al., 
2015, p. 600). The purpose of the study was to investigate whether thwarted 
belongingness and perceived burdensomeness increase the tendency of individuals to 
excessively seek reassurance from others to a degree that elicits rejection, thereby 
exacerbating suicidal ideation. These authors found the answer to be yes, and concluded 
clinicians should assess for excessive reassurance seeking in those experiencing thwarted 
belongingness and perceived burdensomeness. 
In addition, Jahn, Cukrowicz, Mitchell, Poindexter, and Guidry (2015), seeking to 
explain mixed evidence that impaired executive functioning and problem-solving ability 
may increase suicide risk in psychiatric inpatients, studied 110 inpatients from two 
psychiatric units in the Southwestern United States who were older than 17 and admitted 
for elevated suicide risk. Jahn et al. (2015) found perceived burdensomeness mediated the 
relation between objective problem solving and current suicide risk (as opposed to recent 
suicide attempts or current suicide ideation) in psychiatric inpatients, and was 
significantly associated with suicide ideation but not recent suicide attempts. They 
concluded this supported the IPTS, which states perceived burdensomeness is related to 
desire for suicide but not directly related to acting on that desire. 
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Finally, in a study of 399 male prisoners, Mandracchia and Smith (2015) found 
direct support for the IPTS in that “suicide ideation was strongest among those who 
reported higher levels of both thwarted belongingness and perceived burdensomeness. 
This interaction was significant while also controlling for depression and hopelessness” 
(p. 297). 
Summary of the Interpersonal Theory of Suicide 
Franklin et al. (2016) performed a meta-analysis of risk factors for suicidal 
thoughts and behaviors (STBs), based on 365 studies conducted over the past 50 years. 
By way of caution, they noted “most existing studies have tested whether a single 
isolated factor measured at one moment in time predicts STBs over the course of years or 
even decades” (p. 31) and therefore 
have not allowed for tests that approximate how STB risk may work in 
nature.…[They concluded with] the caveat that [their] findings only apply to STB 
risk factors within the narrow methodological limits within which STB risk factors 
have been studied for the past 50 years. (Franklin et al., 2016, p. 31) 
Franklin et al. (2016) emphasized their “results do not mean that widely used STB 
risk guidelines…are invalid or useless” (p. 31). For all that, however, their results were 
that spanning 50 years of research into risk factors, for both suicide attempt prediction 
and suicide death prediction “diagnostic accuracy was only slightly above chance” (p. 
28). In light of this, there is an obvious need for a theory able to explain the complex 
interrelationships among risk factors in a way that is useful to real clinicians dealing with 
real patients. 
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As stated earlier, the essence of the IPTS is that when thwarted belongingness, 
perceived burdensomeness, and the acquired capability for suicide are all present 
simultaneously, the person is at high risk for suicide. This is important theoretically 
because it explains why only a very few of the many people who possess any of a number 
of known risk factors for suicide go on to actually attempt suicide; it is important 
practically because it distills an otherwise unmanageable number of risk factors into three 
overarching factors. 
Bongar, Sullivan, Kendrick, and Tomlins (2017) list the Acquired Capability for 
Suicide Scale (described above) as one of several assessment tools in current use to detect 
suicidal ideation. Moreover, drawing on American Psychiatric Association guidelines, 
these authors summarize 56 factors linked to increased suicide risk, including such 
diverse things as psychiatric illness, unemployment, childhood abuse, hopelessness, 
being male, and being widowed. By providing clinicians with a theoretically and 
empirically sound rationale for focusing on just three, the IPTS has contributed to the 
timely detection of elevated risk and, hopefully, prevention of suicide. This is doubtless 
one reason a survey of experts identified the IPTS as one of the three most impactful 
theories in the history of suicidology (Spencer-Thomas & Jahn, 2012). 
Relationship between Hope and Suicidality 
The idea that hope may bear upon suicidality is not new. For example, in 1973, 
Minkoff, Bergman, Beck, and Beck surveyed 68 suicide attempters admitted 
consecutively to a general hospital and suggested hopelessness is not only a strong 
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indicator of suicidal intent but may actually explain the relationship between depression 
and suicide. 
The Positive Psychology Approach 
However, Minkoff et al. (1973) and other researchers have tended to focus on the 
absence of hope—hopelessness—rather than on its presence. Indeed, much of suicide risk 
research has been concerned with identifying negative factors (such as social isolation) or 
outright psychopathology (such as depression) as contributors to suicidality. Wingate et 
al. (2006) proposed the alternative of studying suicidal behavior from the perspective of 
positive psychology, which is concerned not with pathology but human strengths. (It is 
interesting to note that Thomas Joiner, Jr., whose 2005 book introducing the interpersonal 
theory of suicide was in press at the time Wingate et al. composed their book chapter, 
was one of that chapter’s authors. Perhaps not surprisingly, then, the attributes of 
belongingness and effectiveness—opposites of thwarted belongingness and perceived 
burdensomeness—were discussed by Wingate et al. as being among the positive qualities 
that could be protective against suicide.) 
Positive Relationship between Hope and Acquired Capability for Suicide 
Davidson et al. (2009) took a positive psychology approach in investigating the 
relationship between hope and suicide in a sample of 129 college students. More 
specifically, these authors 
hypothesized that hope and each of its subscales (goals, pathways, and agency) 
would negatively predict suicide risk such that individuals with higher hope 
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scores would tend to have less thwarted belongingness, less burdensomeness, and 
less acquired capability to enact lethal suicide. (p. 501) 
Contrary to their hypothesis, they found high-hope individuals actually had a 
greater degree of acquired capability for suicide. This finding has been replicated in 
subsequent studies (all drawing from college or university populations): Davidson et al. 
(2010) found it to be true for African Americans; O’Keefe and Wingate (2013) did so for 
American Indians/Alaska Natives; and Anestis, Moberg, and Arnau (2014) did so for 
undergraduates generally. 
In a similar vein, Mitchell et al. (2015), participating in a growing trend to study 
resilience factors—positive psychology variables—as moderators of the relationships 
between IPTS risk factors and suicidality, investigated whether the individual 
components of hope theory (agency thinking and pathways thinking) moderate the 
relationship between painful and provocative events and acquired capability for suicide. 
In line with the prior research discussed above, they found “both pathways and agency 
are significant positive predictors of acquired capability for suicide after controlling for 
gender” (p. 254). (Although some prior research made this finding only for pathways and 
not agency, Mitchell et al. suggested the discrepancy may be accounted for by differences 
in statistical approaches.) 
Cheavens, Cukrowicz, Hansen, and Mitchell (2016), also examining the role of 
resilience factors in the IPTS, concluded hope was not a moderator of the relationship 
between thwarted belongingness and suicide ideation. This indirectly supports the earlier 
findings that it is specifically acquired capability for suicide that is increased by hope. 
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Possible explanations. Several explanations have been offered for the 
counterintuitive relationship between hope and acquired capability for suicide. Davidson 
et al. (2009) suggested since high-hope individuals likely have more goals and engage in 
more attempts to reach these, they also likely have more experience of failure and pain 
that contribute, through habituation, to acquired capability for suicide. Anestis et al. 
(2014) contended it is not really hope that is positively related to acquired capability for 
suicide, as the effect was statistically accounted for by distress tolerance. And Mitchell et 
al. stated: 
It is plausible that suicide may be a final act of hope (Snyder, 1994)[.…] The goal 
becomes death by suicide (Snyder et al., 2002).…People who are able to create 
mental pathways to achieve their goals and perceive themselves as being more 
capable of acting on their goals may be more capable of enacting lethal self-harm. 
(p. 254) 
The Role of Locus-of-Hope 
Of these, the explanation of Davidson et al. (2009) has often been accepted. This 
idea, however, has not been empirically tested and seems inadequate to explain the 
apparent connection between hope and acquired capability for suicide. An accurate 
understanding is important so that treatment interventions with suicidal individuals target 
the appropriate factors. A fuller understanding of this phenomenon may lie with the 
concept of locus-of-hope, but to date no study has researched the relationship between 
external loci-of-hope and acquired capability for suicide. 
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The Present Study 
With the above in mind, the present study was intended to extend what is known 
about the relationship between hope and suicidality by investigating this relationship in 
terms of locus-of-hope. I hypothesized that prior findings of a positive relationship 
between hope and acquired capability for suicide apply only to the construct of hope 
before the innovation of Bernardo (2010)—that is, such findings apply only to internal 
locus-of-hope. More specifically, I hypothesized as follows: 
RQ1: Is there a relationship between external locus-of-hope (operationalized 
below as “general hope [external]”) and acquired capability for suicide? 
H01: There is no relationship between general hope (external) and acquired 
capability for suicide. 
Ha1: There is a negative relationship between general hope (external) and 
acquired capability for suicide. 
RQ2: Is there a relationship between general hope (external–family) and acquired 
capability for suicide? 
H02: There is no relationship between general hope (external–family) and 
acquired capability for suicide. 
Ha2: There is a negative relationship between general hope (external–family) 
and acquired capability for suicide. 
RQ3: Is there a relationship between general hope (external–peers) and acquired 
capability for suicide? 
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H03: There is no relationship between general hope (external–peers) and 
acquired capability for suicide. 
Ha3: There is a negative relationship between general hope (external–peers) 
and acquired capability for suicide. 
RQ4: Is there a relationship between general hope (external–spiritual) and 
acquired capability for suicide? 
H04: There is no relationship between general hope (external–spiritual) and 
acquired capability for suicide. 
Ha4: There is a negative relationship between general hope (external–spiritual) 
and acquired capability for suicide. 
Summary of the Literature Review 
In this chapter, I presented a review of the literature that exhaustively delineated 
two major psychological theories and their interrelationship. I succinctly summarized 
hope theory, as formulated by Snyder and his colleagues (e.g., Snyder, 1994, 2002; 
Snyder et al., 1991), as follows: “Hope = Mental Willpower + Waypower for 
Goals….Simply put, hope reflects a mental set in which we have the perceived willpower 
[agency thinking] and the waypower [pathways thinking] to get to our destination” 
(Snyder, 1994, p. 10). 
Bernardo (2010) recognized that one’s own sense of agency and pathways do not 
capture the full construct of hope, because people often hope for things that depend upon 
the agency or pathways of others. Bernardo therefore extended hope theory to include not 
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only internal locus-of-hope, but three external loci-of-hope: family, peers, and 
spiritual/supernatural forces. 
The interpersonal theory of suicide states that thwarted belongingness and 
perceived burdensomeness, if believed to be hopelessly permanent conditions, combine 
to increase the probability of a desire for suicide. Moreover, the IPTS asserts mere desire 
for suicide is insufficient to enable a person to carry it out unless one has also acquired 
the capability for suicide through exposure to painful and provocative events. The 
essence of the IPTS is that when thwarted belongingness, perceived burdensomeness, and 
the acquired capability for suicide are all present simultaneously, the person is at high 
risk for suicide. 
It is known from the line of research initiated by Davidson et al. (2009) that hope 
(internal) is inversely related to thwarted belongingness and perceived burdensomeness, 
but—counterintuitively—positively related to acquired capability for suicide. It is not 
known with any degree of certainty why this is so, and it was not known at all whether it 
is so also with respect to the three external loci-of-hope. In the present study, I aimed to 
fill this gap in the literature by investigating for the first time the effect of external loci-
of-hope on acquired capability for suicide. 
This research was important because if it could be demonstrated that, as 
hypothesized, external loci-of-hope are associated with lowered acquired capability for 
suicide, it follows that interventions designed to raise one’s level of externally located 
hope have the potential to make suicide less likely. In fact, if it is true that internally 
located hope can raise one’s acquired capability for suicide, then helping a suicidal 
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person shift his or her locus of hope from internal to external could prove crucial. There 
can be no greater contribution to positive social change than the saving of life. 
I analyzed data using zero-order correlation to identify any relationship between 
external locus-of-hope and acquired capability for suicide. I performed multiple 
regression analyses to test the hypotheses that higher levels of the various forms of 
external locus-of-hope predict lower levels of acquired capability for suicide. The manner 
in which this was done is set out in detail in Chapter 3. 
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Chapter 3: Research Method 
Introduction 
The purpose of this study was to contribute to the understanding of hope and 
suicidality by examining the relationship between external loci-of-hope and acquired 
capability for suicide. I conjectured that only internally located hope (i.e., hope as defined 
by Snyder, 2002) is directly related to acquired capability for suicide, but that all three 
external loci-of-hope are inversely related to acquired capability for suicide. This chapter 
includes the research design I used in the study and the rationale for its selection; the 
methodology by which a sample of participants was obtained; the instruments 
administered to those participants; and how the data thus obtained were analyzed. The 
chapter concludes with a consideration of threats to validity and a summary. 
Research Design and Rationale 
In examining the relationship described above, the three external loci-of-hope—
external–family, external–peers, and external–spiritual—were the independent variables, 
while acquired capability for suicide was the dependent variable. Consistent with prior 
studies, age, gender, marital status, income, and depression were included as covariates; 
time of survey was sometimes added as will be explained in Chapter 4. I subjected these 
variables to multiple regression analysis in an effort to answer the research question, 
namely, whether relationships exist between and among them and if so, what those 
relationships are. Multiple regression was the appropriate statistical method for use in this 
study because of its utility for helping to understand the nature of a phenomenon when 
testing a theory (Licht, 1995; Tabachnick & Fidell, 2007). Furthermore, use of this 
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technique was necessary because it had been used in prior research that the present study 
sought to extend (Anestis, Moberg, & Arnau, 2014; Davidson et al., 2009, 2010; O’Keefe 
& Wingate, 2013). I did not anticipate any particular time or resource constraints in 
connection with this choice of design. 
Methodology 
Population 
Prior studies in this line of research involving the relationship between hope and 
suicidality (Anestis, Moberg, & Arnau, 2014; Davidson et al., 2009, 2010; O’Keefe & 
Wingate, 2013) have presented their conclusions as applicable to the general adult 
population, although each such study used a convenience sample of college and 
university undergraduates. I sought to take the same approach in the present study with 
respect to university students sampled; issues in making this generalization will be 
discussed below in the section headed “Threats to Validity.” Because the U.S. 
Department of Education estimated 17.8 million students to be enrolled in degree-
granting postsecondary institutions in 2017 (“Digest of Education Statistics, 2015,” n.d.), 
the target population was very large even before generalization.  
Sampling and Sampling Procedures 
As stated above, I sought to use a convenience sample drawn from the participant 
pool of a large, American-based, online university population consisting of students and 
faculty. I anticipated that additional participants might be recruited through online survey 
services (e.g., SurveyMonkey.com, Amazon’s Mechanical Turk). This sampling strategy 
was justified by its utility in facilitating academic research, which typically lacks 
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resources for the kind of large-sample, randomized studies available in marketing 
research or government-funded studies, and has been used extensively in the fields of 
sociology and psychology in spite of methodological limitations inherent in convenience 
samples (Sears, 1986). Amazon’s Mechanical Turk has been shown to be a viable tool for 
academic research and I believed it might eliminate some of the issues associated with 
college convenience samples, for the reasons discussed by Buhrmester, Kwang, & 
Gosling (2016). 
Although, as set forth in Chapter 4, only internet participants were used in 
practice, initially a brief description of the study was to appear together with descriptions 
of other studies in an email sent to members of the university participant pool, and, in the 
case of Mechanical Turk, on that service’s web page for selecting work. Interested 
participants were able to select the present study from this list and participate. The 
sampling frame was to consist of registered members of the university participant pool or, 
if participants were also recruited from internet-based services, all those with internet 
access, limited by the requirement that participants be at least 18 years of age and located 
in the United States (primarily for consistency with previous studies; see first sentence of 
next paragraph). Again, in practice all participants came through Mechanical Turk. 
Prior research into the effect of hope on acquired capability for suicide (Anestis, 
Moberg, & Arnau, 2014; Davidson et al., 2009, 2010; O’Keefe & Wingate, 2013) has 
found small to medium effect sizes, based on Cohen’s (2016) convention of .02, .15, and 
.35 for small, medium, and large effects respectively. Based on this and consistent with 
convention, this study assumed a medium effect size; α = .05; and a power level of .80. 
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For calculating the necessary sample size to test individual predictors (rather than to test 
the regression equation as a whole) using the above assumptions, Tabachnick and Fidell 
(2007) presented a rule of thumb found by Green (1991) to have some empirical support: 
N ≥ 104 + m (where N is the sample size and m is the number of predictor or independent 
variables). Given that the present study would use up to seven predictor variables (the 
five covariates identified above, plus internal hope plus external hope), this equation 
yields 104 + 7 = 111 as the minimum required sample size.  
It is important to note that in discussing the derivation of the above rule of thumb, 
Green (1991) made several crucial points. First, he noted that Cohen’s (1988) convention 
of .02, .15, and .35 for small, medium, and large effects respectively refers to the f2 
statistic (a measure of effect size). This in turn, Green pointed out, is derived from the R2 
statistic, the coefficient of multiple determination representing shared variance between 
the regression equation as a whole and the criterion variable; in terms of R2, Green stated, 
Cohen suggested values of .02, .13, and .26 for small, medium, and large effects 
respectively. In other words, f2 of .15 is equal to R2 of .13, and it is necessary to know 
which statistic is being used. Second, Green goes on to say that either way, these values 
may be too large when what is being measured is not a multiple correlation (testing the 
regression equation as a whole) but—as is the case in the present study—a partial 
correlation between the criterion variable and a single predictor, holding all other 
predictors constant. In such a case, Green concludes, R2 =.07 would be a better measure 
of medium effect size than the .13 suggested by Cohen. The rule of thumb quoted from 
Green by Tabachnick and Fidell (2007) in the preceding paragraph is, as stated, to test 
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individual predictors rather than the regression equation as a whole, and is based on 
Green’s revised effect size of R2 =.07. 
The foregoing technical discussion allows for understanding a corroboration of 
the above sample size based on an a priori sample size analysis with the software 
program GPower (Version 3.1.9.2). With “F tests” selected under “Test family” and 
“Linear multiple regression: Fixed model, R2 increase” selected under “Statistical test,” 
using input parameters of f2 = .0752688 for effect size (derived automatically by the 
software based on an input value of R2 =.07); .05 for α; .80 for power; 1 for number of 
tested predictors, and 7 for total number of predictors, the GPower analysis yielded a 
sample size of 107, which is quite close to but presumably more precise than the 111 
yielded by the rule of thumb. 
Procedures for Recruitment, Participation, and Data Collection 
As explained above, participants were to be recruited through a brief description 
of the study appearing in an email sent to members of the university participant pool, or, 
in the case of Mechanical Turk, on that service’s web page for selecting work. Interested 
participants were able to select the present study from this list and participate. 
Demographic data collected and used as covariates in the study were age, gender, marital 
status, income, depression, and, when necessary per Chapter 4, time of survey. Following 
a recommendation of Mason and Suri (2012), informed consent was provided in a 
separate web page after potential participants had already selected the study. Participants 
who consented were taken to the study page; any who elected not to continue were 
thanked and their participation ended. This method was applicable whether participants 
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had come through the university participant pool or Mechanical Turk. Data were then 
collected using a series of survey instruments to be described in the following section. 
These instruments were accessed by way of a link to the online survey platform 
SurveyMonkey.com. Before exiting the study, participants were to see a debriefing 
statement explaining the purpose of the research and reminding participants how to 
contact the researcher or other appropriate entities in the event of questions or 
complaints. Again following Mason and Suri (2012), this statement was to have been 
presented after study completion but before the “Submit” button was made available, to 
ensure participants saw it before exiting. In practice this could not be done. Instead, as 
outlined in the informed consent form (which contained procedures for questions or 
complaints), participants were directed to a web page on which they could access the 
study results when available. 
Instrumentation and Operationalization of Constructs 
Instrumentation. The following instruments were used in this study: 
Locus-of-Hope Scale (LOHS). As described in Chapter 2, Bernardo (2010) 
developed the Locus-of-Hope Scale (LOHS) by incorporating Snyder et al.’s (1991) Trait 
Hope Scale essentially verbatim (as the internal locus-of-hope subscale) and adding three 
more subscales—external–family, external–peers, and external–spiritual—to reflect those 
external loci-of-hope. Each item is answered on a 4-point Likert-type scale. Including 
eight filler items, the Locus-of-Hope Scale thus consists of 40 items and can yield a total 
score as well as four subscale scores obtained by totaling the relevant items. Because it 
includes the Trait Hope Scale virtually verbatim and also measures the external loci-of-
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hope being investigated in the present research, I used the Locus-of-Hope Scale in this 
study. Email correspondence granting permission for the LOHS to be used in the present 
research may be found in Appendix B. While the LOHS has previously been used 
extensively in Asian populations, it should be noted that it is based on Snyder et al.’s 
(1991) Trait Hope Scale, which was validated and has been used extensively with 
Americans. Thus, there appear to be solid grounds for believing the LOHS is appropriate 
for Americans, although sound research strategy dictates vigilance for any indication this 
may not be so. 
The original Trait Hope Scale, which forms the basis for the LOHS, was validated 
by Snyder et al. (1991). Based on six samples of college students, one of psychiatric 
outpatients, and one of psychiatric inpatients, these authors reported acceptable internal 
consistency with Cronbach’s alphas ranging from .74 to .84 and item-remainder 
coefficients from .23 to .63. Snyder et al. also reported studies showing test-retest 
reliability to be .85 over a 3-week interval (N = 130, p < .001); .73 over an 8-week 
interval (N = 115; p < .001); and .76 and .82 respectively in two studies over 10-week 
intervals (Ns = 205 and 133; ps < .001). The 2-factor structure of hope (agency and 
pathways components) was confirmed using principal-components exploratory factor 
analysis. To establish convergent validity, Snyder et al. cited numerous studies in which 
the Trait Hope Scale (which, at that time, was known simply as the Hope Scale) was 
correlated with measures of various other constructs hypothesized to either positively or 
negatively relate to hope. For example, they cited two studies in which Scheier and 
Carver’s (1985) Life Orientation Test (LOT), a measure of dispositional optimism, was 
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correlated .60 and .50 respectively with the Hope Scale; another example involves a 
correlation of .58 with responses to the Rosenberg (1965) Self-Esteem Scale. Also under 
the heading of convergent validity (although seemingly, discriminant validity would be a 
more traditional description), Snyder et al. reported negative correlations between the 
Hope Scale and measures of constructs hypothesized to be at odds with hope. For 
example, they cited a finding that the Hope Scale correlated -.51 with Beck, Weissman, 
Lester, and Trexler’s (1974) Hopelessness Scale; as another example, the Hope Scale was 
said to correlate -.42 with the Beck Depression Inventory (Beck, Ward, Mendelsohn, 
Mock, & Erbaugh, 1961). Snyder et al. did claim discriminant validity in the form of 
insignificant (.06 and -.03 respectively) correlations with two subscales of the Self-
Consciousness Scale by Fenigstein, Scheier, and Buss (1975), about which Snyder et al. 
observed, “there was no obvious theoretical reason to predict that higher as compared 
with lower hope people would vary on these dimensions” (p. 575). 
Building on the established reliability and validity of the Trait Hope Scale as 
detailed above, Bernardo (2010) constructed the Locus-of-Hope Scale by modifying the 
eight original Trait Hope Scale items three ways, thereby generating three new sets of 
eight items corresponding to Bernardo’s three external loci-of-hope. As explained in 
Chapter 2, these became the three external locus-of-hope subscales, while the original 
Trait Hope Scale items were retained as the internal locus-of-hope subscale. However, 
three minor modifications were made even to the original items. Regarding these, 
Bernardo (2010) wrote: “One item was modified to remove an American expression that 
was not familiar to some of the Filipino participants, and another item was modified to 
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more explicitly express the personal focus” (p. 945). Close reading of Bernardo’s items 
reveals that Snyder et al.’s (1991) phrase, “I can think of many ways to get out of a jam” 
has been replaced by “I can think of many ways for me to get out of a problem” 
[emphases added]; “jam” is the “American expression…not familiar to some of the 
Filipino participants.” Likewise, Snyder et al.’s “There are lots of ways around any 
problem” has been replaced by “There are lots of ways I can get around any problem” 
[emphasis added]; the added words “more explicitly express the personal focus.” The 
current version of the LOHS includes a third modification: Snyder et al.’s “I’ve been 
pretty successful in life” has been changed to “I have many ways to become successful in 
life.” Bernardo made this change for two reasons: first, because he felt the phrase “pretty 
successful” was very American; and second, because he wished to keep to the goal-
oriented quality of the item (A. B. I. Bernardo, personal communication, July 18, 2016). 
It is noteworthy that Snyder et al. refer to the “sense of successful determination in regard 
to goals” (p. 572) as implicit within this past-tense item but explicit in present-tense 
items; Bernardo’s third modification thus has the desired effect of making the item’s 
goal-oriented quality more explicit. 
Bernardo (2010) found Cronbach alpha levels of each of the four new hope 
dimensions—internal, external–family, external–peers, and external–spiritual—to be .80, 
.91, .87, and .95 respectively, which are very high. He used confirmatory factor analysis 
to verify that the four locus-of-hope dimensions indeed represent distinct constructs. 
Bernardo tested four models: 1) a one-factor model in which all 32 hope items (the four 
8-item subscales combined) comprise one factor (because in reality it makes no 
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difference where one locates one’s hope, that is, there is no such legitimate construct as 
locus-of-hope); 2) a two-factor model in which the eight internal locus-of-hope items 
comprise one factor and the 24 external locus-of-hope items another factor (meaning 
there is a legitimate distinction between internal and external loci-of-hope, but no valid 
distinction among the proposed three external loci-of-hope themselves); 3) a four-factor 
model in which each of the four 8-item subscales represents a distinct factor (supporting 
the idea that there are indeed four loci-of-hope but without confirmation that there is any 
distinction between internal and external loci-of-hope); and 4) a four-factor model as 
above but including two higher-order factors, one of which comprises the external–family 
and external–peers subscales (in order to represent external loci-of-hope involving other 
people, jointly referred to as external–relational locus-of-hope), and one comprising this 
external–relational locus-of-hope plus external–spiritual locus-of-hope and thus being 
made up of all three external loci-of-hope. This second higher-order factor was allowed 
to correlate with the internal locus-of-hope factor. This fourth model would support not 
only the existence of four distinct loci-of-hope but also a difference between internal and 
external loci-of-hope generally. Bernardo reported the first two models were not 
supported by the data (χ2/df ratios 5.119 and 2.569 respectively; RMSEA .228 and .119 
respectively; and CFI .446 and .790 respectively). Both four-factor models were 
supported by the data (i.e., the validity of the four subscales was confirmed) but the data 
could not distinguish between models 3 and 4 (identical χ2/df, RMSEA, and CFI of 1.570, 
.050, and .924, respectively, for both models). Despite this, Bernardo found some 
evidence for the distinctiveness of internal and external loci-of-hope in the results of a 
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second study in which they were differentially correlated with measures of individualism 
and collectivism respectively. 
Interpersonal Needs Questionnaire (INQ–15). The Interpersonal Needs 
Questionnaire (INQ–15; Van Orden, Cukrowicz, Witte, & Joiner, 2012), has been used 
with both young and older adults, including clinical and nonclinical samples and 
undergraduates. As discussed in Chapter 2, it is designed to assess feelings of thwarted 
belongingness and perceived burdensomeness, and is a staple in research into the 
interpersonal theory of suicide. It is therefore appropriate for the present study. The INQ–
15 is freely available for download from a web page maintained by the research 
laboratory of IPTS originator Thomas Joiner, Ph.D. at Florida State University 
(https://psy.fsu.edu/~joinerlab/resources.html); additionally, email correspondence 
granting permission for the INQ–15 to be used in the present research may be found in 
Appendix B. 
Van Orden, Cukrowicz, Witte, and Joiner (2012) tested the construct validity of 
the IPTS’s definitions of thwarted belongingness and perceived burdensomeness, using 
exploratory and confirmatory factor analysis to examine whether these two constructs 
were latent within the instrument. Using a variety of fit indices (chi-square [χ2]; 
standardized root-mean-square residual [SRMR]; comparative fit index [CFI]; Tucker–
Lewis index [TLI]; and root-mean-square error of approximation [RMSEA]), these 
authors found the “15-item model provides a viable representation of the latent structure 
of the INQ across diverse samples, with two distinct, but related constructs, as posited by 
the interpersonal theory” (p. 206). Having established that, Van Orden et al. went on to 
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investigate whether the INQ-15 was reliable and generalizable to different populations. 
Using a sample of young adults (N = 456) as a comparison group, they used multiple 
group confirmatory factor analysis to test whether a sample of older adults (N = 265) and 
a separate sample of those with greater psychopathology (i.e., clinical outpatients; N = 
397) responded to the INQ in a way that indicates comparable factor structure to that of 
the comparison group. Results indicated adequate fit for the model imposing equivalent 
factor structure (test of equal form) for both young adults vs. older adults (χ2 = 394.636, p 
< .001; CFI = .898) and young adults vs. outpatients (χ2 = 508.336, p < .001; CFI = .907), 
suggesting the two-factor structure that was validated with respect to young adults is also 
valid for these other populations. Moreover, a test of equivalent factor loadings using the 
Yuan-Bentler scaled χ2 difference showed the INQ items performed equivalently for both 
young adults vs. older adults (χ2 = 437.843, p < .001; YBχ2diff = 18.010) and young adults 
vs. outpatients (χ2 = 550.330, p < .001; YBχ2diff = 19.985), although using the CFI 
difference, results supported equality of factor loading for young adults vs. outpatients 
(CFI = .899; ΔCFI = .008) but were equivocal for young adults vs. older adults  
(CFI = .883; ΔCFI = .015). This suggests the INQ items are appropriate indicators of the 
respective constructs (thwarted belongingness and perceived burdensomeness) regardless 
of age or clinical severity. Van Orden et al. noted, however, that equivalence of intercepts 
was not supported for either comparison, suggesting “some items may artificially inflate 
or underestimate ‘true scores’ for clinical and older adult populations” (p. 207). 
To assess convergent and divergent validity, Van Orden et al. (2012) administered 
measures of constructs hypothesized to be either related to or separate from both thwarted 
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belongingness and perceived burdensomeness. For young adults (N = 602) these were 
loneliness, social support, self-liking, and relatedness (all hypothesized to be more 
strongly related to belongingness); and competence, autonomy, responsibility to family, 
and self-competence (all hypothesized to be more strongly related to perceived 
burdensomeness). For older adults (N = 265), the measured constructs were loneliness, 
social support, and lower meaning in life (all hypothesized to be more strongly related to 
belongingness); and responsibility to family, lower social worth, and death ideation (all 
hypothesized to be more strongly related to perceived burdensomeness). For both groups, 
they used structural equation modeling to measure the relationships among the latent 
variables (thwarted belongingness and perceived burdensomeness) and the observed 
variables enumerated above. Results indicated “support for convergent validity for 
thwarted belongingness and perceived burdensomeness in both older and young adults, as 
well as some evidence of divergent validity for both subscales among older adults” 
(p.210). However, with respect to belongingness they noted a need for further research to 
establish discriminant validity. 
Finally, Van Orden et al. (2012) used the Beck Scale for Suicidal Ideation (Beck 
& Steer, 1991) to test what they characterized as “the key outcome with regards to the 
criterion validity of the [sic] thwarted belongingness and perceived burdensomeness” (pp. 
210–211): namely, whether they predict—as the IPTS says they should—suicidal 
ideation. They found greater odds of reporting suicidal ideation were associated with 
higher levels of both thwarted belongingness (odds ratio [OR] = 1.59, p < .01) and 
perceived burdensomeness (OR = 2.21, p < .01). 
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Acquired Capability for Suicide Scale–Fearlessness about Death (ACSS–FAD). 
As reviewed in Chapter 2, Ribeiro et al. (2014) developed the ACSS-FAD from a former 
version (the ACSS) to accommodate the 2010 refinements to the IPTS by Van Orden et 
al. Although the IPTS defines acquired capability for suicide as comprising both 
fearlessness about death and increased physical pain tolerance, Ribeiro et al. found the 
ACSS contained only one item tapping the pain tolerance component, which “precluded 
constructing a latent measurement model of the pain tolerance domain” (p. 118). The 
revised instrument therefore measures only fearlessness about death and is named 
accordingly. Despite this shortcoming (as was stated in Chapter 1), the ACSS-FAD is in 
fact used to measure the total construct of acquired capability for suicide; as Ribeiro et al. 
noted, “Fearlessness about death was also related to a number of outcomes associated 
with pain perception, including self-perceived ability to withstand physical discomfort 
and fear of physical pain, as well as a behavioral assessment of pain tolerance” (p.124). 
Because of this, and because it has been used extensively with diverse populations 
including undergraduates and young adults, it is appropriate for use in this study. The 
ACSS-FAD is freely available for download from a web page maintained by the research 
laboratory of IPTS originator Thomas Joiner, Ph.D. at Florida State University 
(https://psy.fsu.edu/~joinerlab/resources.html); additionally, email correspondence 
granting permission for the ACSS-FAD to be used in the present research may be found 
in Appendix B. 
To confirm the new instrument measured the single factor of fearlessness about 
death, Ribeiro et al. used confirmatory factor analysis with three undergraduate 
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convenience samples (Ns = 227, 257, and 723, respectively). Using the same fit indices as 
their research colleagues Van Orden et al. (2012), (chi-square [χ2]; standardized root-
mean-square residual [SRMR]; comparative fit index [CFI]; Tucker–Lewis index [TLI]; 
and root-mean-square error of approximation [RMSEA]), Ribeiro et al. found “with the 
exception of the significant Yuan-Bentler chi square (YB χ2), all other indices indicated 
good-to-excellent fit to the data” (p. 118; Sample 1: YB χ2 = 30.85, p = .03, SRMR = .04, 
CFI = .97, TLI = .96, RMSEA [90% CI] = .06 [.02, .09]; Sample 2: YB χ2 = 41.99, p = 
.002, SRMR = .05, CFI = .93, TLI = .90, RMSEA [90% CI] = .08 [.05, .11]; Sample 3: 
YB χ2 = 88.65, p < .001, SRMR = .04, CFI = .95, TLI = .92, RMSEA [90% CI] = .08 
[.06, .10]). Using multiple-group confirmatory factor analysis with participant Sample 3 
(N = 723), Ribeiro et al. went on to find “good evidence” (p. 120) for the generalizability 
of the ACSS-FAD model across males (N = 322) and females (N = 406), and noted 
females tend to score lower on the underlying factor of fearlessness about death than do 
males. (There is a 5-participant discrepancy in these sample sizes which is unexplained in 
Ribeiro et al.) Finally, to establish convergent and discriminant validity, these authors 
used structural equation modeling to regress relevant outcome variables (hypothesized to 
be either similar to or different from fearlessness about death) on the fearlessness about 
death measurement model in Sample 2 (N = 257) and a fourth undergraduate sample 
designated Sample 4 (N = 193), as well as a Sample 5 consisting of psychiatric inpatients 
(N = 67). The variables measured were painful and provocative events, pain threshold, 
pain tolerance, stoicism, suicidal intent preceding a lethal suicide attempt, fear of suicide, 
fear of pain, discomfort intolerance, fear associated with presence or consequences of 
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physical anxiety sensations, depression, suicidal ideation and intent over the past week, 
and frequency and intensity of suicidal ideation over the past two weeks. In Sample 2, the 
latent variable of pain tolerance and four observed variables were regressed on the 
ACSS-FAD, controlling for gender. Excepting the Yuan-Bentler chi square indicator, 
adequate-to-good model fit was found (YB χ2 [103] = 199.72, p < .001, SRMR = .05, CFI 
= .94, TLI = .92, RMSEA [90% CI] = .07 [.06, .08]). In Sample 4, the pain threshold 
latent variable and eight observed variables were regressed onto fearlessness about death, 
controlling for gender. Again excepting the Yuan-Bentler chi square indicator, good 
model fit was found (YB χ2 [124] = 211.86, p < .001, SRMR = .04, CFI = .96, TLI = .93, 
RMSEA [90% CI] = .06 [.04, .07]). Pearson product-moment correlations were used in 
Sample 5, with correlations tending to support convergent and discriminant validity of 
the ACSS-FAD with psychiatric outpatients. For example, ACSS-FAD total scores were 
strongly correlated with perceived courage to make a suicide attempt (r = .67, p < .001) 
and showed a strong negative correlation with fear of suicide (r = -.51, p < .001). 
Depression Anxiety Stress Scales–21 (DASS–21). The Depression Anxiety Stress 
Scales–21 (DASS–21; Lovibond & Lovibond, 1995) is a short form of Lovibond and 
Lovibond's (1995) 42-item Depression Anxiety Stress Scales (DASS). It consists of 21 
items, with three 7-item subscales respectively measuring depression, anxiety, and stress 
over the past week. The DASS-21 is a well-regarded and widely used measure of these 
three constructs and has been validated using a large (N = 1794) nonclinical sample of 
United Kingdom adults (Henry & Crawford, 2005); it was used by Anestis et al. (2014) 
to measure depression as a covariate in examining the relationship among hope, distress 
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tolerance, and acquired capability for suicide. The DASS-21 is therefore an appropriate 
instrument for the present research. Following the procedure used by Anestis et al., only 
the depression subscale (items 3, 5, 10, 13, 16, 17, and 21) will be used in this study. The 
DASS questionnaire is in the public domain and may be freely downloaded from the 
developers’ website, as described in Appendix B. Nevertheless, once IRB approval is 
obtained, the primary author will, as a courtesy, be notified of this study’s intent to use 
the DASS. 
Henry and Crawford (2005) found the DASS-21 to be internally consistent, with 
Cronbach’s alpha values of .88, .82, and .90 for the depression, anxiety, and stress 
subscales respectively, and .93 for the total scale. They used confirmatory factor analysis 
to establish that the instrument measures three specific factors designated depression, 
anxiety, and stress, with a general, fourth, factor representing psychological distress. Fit 
was assessed using the Satorra–Bentler scaled chi-squared statistic (S-B χ2), the robust 
comparative fit index (RCFI), the standardized root mean squared residual (SRMR), and 
the root mean squared error of approximation (RMSEA). The model just described was 
found to have S-B χ2 = 522.7, df = 162, RCFI = .941, SRMR = .026, RMSEA = .050. 
Additionally, the DASS-21 showed good convergent and discriminant validity relative to 
other validated measures of depression and anxiety. 
Operationalization of constructs. As set forth in Chapter 1, the constructs 
studied in this research were operationalized as follows: 
Hope. Pursuant to Snyder’s (2002) hope theory, the construct of hope comprises 
pathways and agency components in addition to the combination of these (herein referred 
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to as general hope). Bernardo (2010) extended this concept to include three external loci-
of-hope, by contrast with which Snyder’s construct would be termed internal locus-of-
hope. Each of Bernardo’s four loci-of-hope (internal, external–family, external–peers, 
and external–spiritual) can also be conceptualized in terms of a pathways component, an 
agency component, or a combination of the two (the general aspect), yielding a total of 
twelve distinct aspects of hope. If one needs to refer to external hope generally (that is, all 
three external loci-of-hope together), or to all possible combinations at once (the overall 
construct of hope), even more distinct terms are needed. For the sake of precision, 
therefore, the following terms related to hope were operationally defined with reference 
to the Locus-of-Hope Scale (LOHS; Bernardo, 2010): 
Overall general hope. The total score obtained by summing all items on the 
LOHS except the eight filler items (i.e., except items 4, 8, 12, 18, 25, 29, 31, 37). Higher 
scores indicate higher levels of hope. 
Overall pathways hope. The total score obtained by summing all pathways items 
on the LOHS (i.e., items 1, 5, 7, 9, 11, 14, 16, 19, 20, 22, 23, 28, 33, 36, 38, 39). Higher 
scores indicate higher levels of pathways hope.  
Overall agency hope. The total score obtained by summing all agency items on 
the LOHS (i.e., items 2, 3, 6, 10, 13, 15, 17, 21, 24, 26, 27, 30, 32, 34, 35, 40). Higher 
scores indicate higher levels of agency hope. 
General hope (internal). The total score obtained by summing all eight items on 
the internal locus-of-hope subscale of the LOHS (i.e., items 1, 6, 14, 20, 23, 27, 30, 40). 
Note that (except for three minor rewordings discussed earlier in this chapter) these are 
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the identical items as the non-filler items of the Trait Hope Scale (Snyder, 2002); for this 
reason, a person’s score on the internal locus-of-hope subscale of the LOHS should be 
the same as that person’s score on the Trait Hope Scale. And, as with the Trait Hope 
Scale itself, whose total score is the sum of its pathways and agency subscales, the 
internal locus-of-hope subscale score on the LOHS is the sum of its own pathways and 
agency components. Higher scores indicate higher levels of internal hope, that is, higher 
levels of trait hope as defined by Snyder (2002). 
Pathways hope (internal). The total score obtained by summing the pathways 
items (i.e., items 1, 14, 20, 23) on the internal locus-of-hope subscale of the LOHS. 
Higher scores indicate higher levels of the pathways component of internal hope. A 
sample item is: I can think of many ways for me to get out of a problem. 
Agency hope (internal). The total score obtained by summing the agency items 
(i.e., items 6, 27, 30, 40) on the internal locus-of-hope subscale of the LOHS. Higher 
scores indicate higher levels of the agency component of internal hope. A sample item is: 
I energetically pursue my goals. 
General hope (external). The total score obtained by summing all 24 items on the 
three external locus-of-hope subscales (external–family, external–peers, and external–
spiritual) of the LOHS. Higher scores indicate higher levels of external hope. 
Pathways hope (external). The total score obtained by summing the pathways 
items on the three external locus-of-hope subscales (external–family, external–peers, and 
external–spiritual) of the LOHS. Higher scores indicate higher levels of the pathways 
component of external hope. 
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Agency hope (external). The total score obtained by summing the agency items on 
the three external locus-of-hope subscales (external–family, external–peers, and external–
spiritual) of the LOHS. Higher scores indicate higher levels of the agency component of 
external hope 
General hope (external–family). The total score obtained by summing all eight 
items on the external–family locus-of-hope subscale of the LOHS (i.e., items 3, 7, 11, 16, 
21, 24, 32, 39). Higher scores indicate higher levels of the external–family component of 
external hope. 
Pathways hope (external–family). The total score obtained by summing the 
pathways items (i.e., items 7, 11, 16, 39) on the external–family locus-of-hope subscale 
of the LOHS. Higher scores indicate higher levels of the pathways component of 
external–family hope. A sample item is: My family has lots of ways of helping me attain 
my goals. 
Agency hope (external–family). The total score obtained by summing the agency 
items (i.e., items 3, 21, 24, 32) on the external–family locus-of-hope subscale of the 
LOHS. Higher scores indicate higher levels of the agency component of external–family 
hope. A sample item is: I am confident that my family will support me in the goals that 
are important to me. 
General hope (external–peers). The total score obtained by summing all eight 
items on the external–peers locus-of-hope subscale of the LOHS (i.e., items 5, 10, 13, 19, 
26, 33, 35, 38). Higher scores indicate higher levels of the external–peers component of 
external hope. 
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Pathways hope (external–peers). The total score obtained by summing the 
pathways items (i.e., items 5, 19, 33, 38) on the external–peers locus-of-hope subscale of 
the LOHS. Higher scores indicate higher levels of the pathways component of external–
peers hope. A sample item is: I count on my friends to think of different ways of reaching 
the goals that are important to me. 
Agency hope (external–peers). The total score obtained by summing the agency 
items (i.e., items 10, 13, 26, 35) on the external–peers locus-of-hope subscale of the 
LOHS. Higher scores indicate higher levels of the agency component of external–peers 
hope. A sample item is: My friends always support me in the pursuit of my life goals. 
General hope (external–spiritual). The total score obtained by summing all eight 
items on the external–spiritual locus-of-hope subscale of the LOHS (i.e., items 2, 9, 15, 
17, 22, 28, 34, 36). Higher scores indicate higher levels of the external–spiritual 
component of external hope. 
Pathways hope (external–spiritual). The total score obtained by summing the 
pathways items (i.e., items 9, 22, 28, 36) on the external–spiritual locus-of-hope subscale 
of the LOHS. Higher scores indicate higher levels of the pathways component of 
external–spiritual hope. A sample item is: When I am discouraged, I know that [G-d] will 
provide ways to solve the problems I face. 
Agency hope (external–spiritual). The total score obtained by summing the 
agency items (i.e., items 2, 15, 17, 34) on the external–spiritual locus-of-hope subscale of 
the LOHS. Higher scores indicate higher levels of the agency component of external–
spiritual hope. A sample item is: I will attain my life goals by trusting [G-d]. 
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Acquired capability for suicide (ACS). The total score (i.e., after adjusting for 
three reverse-scored items [2, 3, and 5], the sum of the seven item scores) obtained on the 
Acquired Capability for Suicide Scale–Fearlessness About Death (ACSS-FAD; Ribeiro 
et al., 2014). Higher scores indicate greater levels of fearlessness about death and, by 
extension, greater acquired capability for suicide. A sample item is: The fact that I am 
going to die does not affect me. 
Thwarted belongingness (TB). After adjusting for six reverse-scored items (7, 8, 
10, 13, 14, and 15), the sum of the item scores obtained on the thwarted belongingness 
subscale (items 7–15) of the Interpersonal Needs Questionnaire (INQ-15; Van Orden, 
Cukrowicz, Witte, & Joiner, 2012). Higher scores indicate a greater degree of thwarted 
belongingness. A sample item is: These days, I rarely interact with people who care 
about me. 
Perceived burdensomeness (PB). The sum of the item scores obtained on the 
perceived burdensomeness subscale (items 1–6) of the INQ-15. Higher scores indicate a 
greater degree of perceived burdensomeness. A sample item is: These days, the people in 
my life would be better off if I were gone. 
Depression. The sum of the seven items on the depression subscale (items 3, 5, 
10, 13, 16, 17, and 21) of the DASS-21 (Lovibond & Lovibond, 1995), multiplied by 2 
for equivalence to the DASS-42. Higher scores indicate a greater degree of depression. A 
sample item is: I couldn't seem to experience any positive feeling at all. 
Data analysis plan. Data were analyzed using IBM® SPSS® Statistics software 
(Version 24). Prior to analysis, data were examined to verify accuracy of entry and to 
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identify any missing data. Missing data; outliers; and issues of normality, linearity, and 
homoscedasticity; as well as multicollinearity, singularity, and independence of residuals 
were examined and where necessary, problems involving these issues were resolved 
following procedures recommended by Tabachnick & Fidell (2007). 
Research questions and hypotheses. There were four specific research questions 
to be determined in this study: 
RQ1: Is there a relationship between external locus-of-hope (operationalized 
below as “general hope [external]”) and acquired capability for suicide? 
H01: There is no relationship between general hope (external) and acquired 
capability for suicide. 
Ha1: There is a negative relationship between general hope (external) and 
acquired capability for suicide. 
RQ2: Is there a relationship between general hope (external–family) and acquired 
capability for suicide? 
H02: There is no relationship between general hope (external–family) and 
acquired capability for suicide. 
Ha2: There is a negative relationship between general hope (external–family) 
and acquired capability for suicide. 
RQ3: Is there a relationship between general hope (external–peers) and acquired 
capability for suicide? 
H03: There is no relationship between general hope (external–peers) and 
acquired capability for suicide. 
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Ha3: There is a negative relationship between general hope (external–peers) 
and acquired capability for suicide. 
RQ4: Is there a relationship between general hope (external–spiritual) and 
acquired capability for suicide? 
H04: There is no relationship between general hope (external–spiritual) and 
acquired capability for suicide. 
Ha4: There is a negative relationship between general hope (external–spiritual) 
and acquired capability for suicide. 
In all cases, the independent variables were external hope and each of its three 
specific loci (external–family, external–peers, and external–spiritual), each as measured 
by its respective score on the Locus-of-Hope Scale (LOHS; Bernardo, 2010). The 
dependent variable was acquired capability for suicide, as measured by the Acquired 
Capability for Suicide Scale—Fearlessness About Death (ACSS-FAD; Ribeiro et al., 
2014). 
Data analysis. As a preliminary step, zero-order correlations among predictors 
were examined as a check for multicollinearity. Based on prior research with the same or 
similar predictors, no problematic correlations were expected. Next, the covariates—age, 
gender, marital status, income, depression, and sometimes time of study—were entered 
together in the first step of a three-step hierarchical regression procedure. Covariates 
were included based on their use in prior research that the present study sought to extend 
(Anestis, Moberg, & Arnau, 2014; Davidson et al., 2009, 2010; O’Keefe & Wingate, 
2013), and for the same rationale, which is that they “are all known to be associated with 
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suicide risk (Davidson et al., 2010, p. 174).” Anestis, Moberg, and Arnau (2014) 
substituted depression for marital status (marital status was not included in their data 
collection) to rule out the possibility that it is depression, not hope, that affects thwarted 
belongingness and perceived burdensomeness. 
The second step of the regression, involving the covariates plus additional 
predictors, was repeated separately for each of the following six sets of related predictors: 
1) overall general hope, overall pathways hope, and overall agency hope; 2) general hope 
(internal), pathways hope (internal), and agency hope (internal); 3) general hope 
(external), pathways hope (external), and agency hope (external); 4) general hope 
(external–family), pathways hope (external–family), and agency hope (external–family); 
5) general hope (external–peers), pathways hope (external–peers), and agency hope 
(external–peers); 6) general hope (external–spiritual), pathways hope (external–spiritual), 
and agency hope (external–spiritual). In the third step, intended to identify any unique 
effects on the dependent variable of external hope and its individual components, the 
covariates and general hope (internal) were entered together, followed by sets 3–6 
specified above (i.e., the sets corresponding to external hope and its individual 
components). 
Reduction of experimentwise error rates (“alpha inflation”) is an important 
consideration in multiple regression, since, conceptually, each step of a multiple 
regression analysis involves testing the statistical significance of not only R (for the 
regression equation overall), but the partial coefficients associated with each predictor 
(Licht, 1995). For this reason, the recommendations of Cohen, Cohen, West, and Aiken 
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(2003) were followed in that the smallest number of predictors required were included in 
each set; redundancy among predictors was avoided; and an adaptation of Fisher’s 
protected t test was applied such that statistical significance of partial coefficients (i.e., 
contributions of specific predictors) were examined only if overall R is significant 
(determined at each stage of the analysis by F for the set of predictors being examined). 
Results were interpreted when alpha levels were below .05. 
Threats to Validity 
External validity. Two threats to external validity were relevant to the present 
research: 
Specification errors. It is important in multiple regression analysis that all 
relevant predictors be included, because adding even one additional predictor can 
radically alter the results (by yielding different values for the multiple regression indexes; 
Licht, 1995). In this study, care was taken to include all covariates used by prior 
researchers, so as to minimize the chance that results will not generalize to circumstances 
involving other predictors. 
Sampling bias. As noted earlier, this study was to have followed the precedent of 
prior research in using a convenience sample of students. However, convenience samples 
cannot be assumed to represent the population. With respect to college students, Sears 
(1986) noted a number of ways in which they differ from the general population of 
adults. Furthermore, O’Keefe and Wingate (2013) cited findings that the suicide rate for 
college students is approximately half that of non-students aged 20–24 years. 
Consequently, the present research, which was to have used a student sample to 
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investigate the relationship between hope and suicide, should have been viewed as 
exploratory with respect to the general population. It is noteworthy, though, that 
Davidson et al. (2010) argued for the generalizability of their convenience sample of 
Black undergraduates on the ground that “it is ideal to generalize the presence of 
theoretical findings to many different populations” (p. 177), as long as they do not 
involve a new field of application. They add, “a great deal of research on suicidal 
behavior and risk factors has been conducted with college samples” (p. 177). 
For all that, as related in Chapter 4, the present study did not use a student sample 
in practice, so the above concern proved inapplicable. 
Internal validity. This study used a nonexperimental design, being a correlational 
investigation based on survey research. For this reason it cannot be used to infer 
causation and does not claim internal validity, a construct applicable to experimental 
designs. 
Construct validity. The construct validity of the present research is predicated on 
that of the survey instruments it used. These have been described above, and have been 
found to have content validity, internal consistency, convergent validity, and discriminant 
validity, which are the elements indicative of construct validity (Mitchell & Jolley, 2004). 
Statistical conclusion validity. As has been explained earlier, care was taken to 
ensure that conclusions based on the results of this research would be statistically valid. 
For example, sample size was calculated to provide adequate statistical power, 
assumptions required by the statistical tests were met, only reliable measures were used, 
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and alpha inflation was minimized. Accordingly, it is judged that the present research 
allows for valid statistical conclusions. 
Ethical Procedures 
Treatment of Participants 
IRB approval. Approval was sought and received from Walden University’s 
Institutional Review Board (IRB) prior to commencement of the study, including the 
collection of data. The approval number was 12-05-17-0021136. 
Recruitment materials and processes. As discussed earlier, it was anticipated 
that participants would be drawn from the participant pool of Walden University and 
supplemented by Amazon’s Mechanical Turk service. In practice, only Mechanical Turk 
was used. Recruitment circumstances and materials conformed to all relevant ethical 
guidelines, including the following: A clear explanation was provided of the study’s 
purpose and how participants would be informed of its results. No vulnerable populations 
were specifically targeted for inclusion in the research. Should a vulnerable individual 
have happened to participate without the researcher’s knowledge, such inclusion would 
have been justified because the benefits of the research outweighed the impracticality of 
screening for every conceivable vulnerability. Minors and people situated outside the 
United States (so as to most closely approximate the samples used in prior research) were 
excluded, in a respectful and nonstigmatizing manner. The research design was such that 
all participants could potentially benefit equally from the research. Due to the anonymous 
survey nature of the recruitment and data collection, no coercion; risk to the participants’ 
relationships, legal standing, or other status; or similar factors were possible. Such risks 
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as were foreseeable, such as psychological risk described below, were fully 
acknowledged and described. Informed consent was obtained before any individual was 
permitted to participate. 
Data collection. Informed consent and data collection were anonymous, and 
involved survey instruments participants could complete without being observed by third 
parties. Due to the anonymity of participation, no risks were foreseen to participants’ 
professional, social, economic, or any other standing. However, the nature of the study as 
well as the need to replicate prior research using the same survey instruments required 
inquiry into participants’ past histories of suicidality, depression, and painful or 
provocative events, and such inquiries could conceivably have caused distress to some 
participants. To minimize this risk, disclosure of the nature of the study and the fact that 
some participants might experience distress was made in the informed consent form, 
allowing individuals who anticipated distress to avoid same by declining participation. 
For the benefit of any who elected to participate but unexpectedly experienced distress, 
information about where to obtain help (national suicide hotline) was prominently 
provided. Such risks and burdens of participation were, however, minimal—as has been 
demonstrated by research into this very issue (see, e.g., Gould et al., 2005; Michaels, 
Chu, Silva, Schulman, & Joiner, 2015; Reynolds, Lindenboim, Comtois, Murray, & 
Linehan, 2006)—and in any event reasonable in consideration of the new knowledge this 
research was expected to offer, especially insofar as it might contribute to the reduction 
of suicide. None of the survey instruments contained items that would have revealed 
criminal activity or otherwise have necessitated reporting. The researcher was 
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appropriately qualified to undertake this research; was properly supervised in all data 
collection procedures; and complied with any requirements for legal use of the survey 
instruments. 
Treatment of Data 
As noted above, data were anonymous; however, to preserve the integrity of the 
research, data will be stored securely for at least five years. Due to the broad geographic 
and demographic base of the sample, it is not expected that participants’ identities might 
inadvertently be deducible.  
Other Ethical Issues 
The researcher had no conflicts of interest bearing on the present research. 
Incentives used ($2.00 payment per participant through Mechanical Turk) were of 
sufficiently small value to avoid any element of coercion and such incentives were paid 
anonymously. 
Summary 
In this chapter, the research design for this study was presented along with its 
rationale, followed by the details of the methodology employed. It was stated that 
anonymous survey research was conducted on a sample of 193 participants to gather 
relevant demographic information and data related to hope and suicide. This data was 
then analyzed using zero-order correlation and multiple regression to investigate the 
relationship between external locus-of-hope and acquired capability for suicide. The 
chapter concluded with a discussion of ethical issues. 
Chapter 4 will report the results of this research and analysis.  
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Chapter 4: Results  
Introduction 
As first stated in Chapter 1, Bernardo (2010) extended hope theory by introducing 
the construct of external locus-of-hope; hope as previously conceptualized by Snyder and 
colleagues (e.g., Snyder, 1994, 2002; Snyder et al., 1991) can by contrast be thought of as 
internal locus-of-hope. Research into the relationship of hope to the three components—
perceived burdensomeness, thwarted belongingness, and acquired capability for 
suicide—of the interpersonal theory of suicide (Joiner, 2005; Van Orden et al., 2010) 
found (internal) hope lowers perceived burdensomeness and thwarted belongingness but, 
unexpectedly, raises acquired capability for suicide. The purpose of this study was to 
contribute to our understanding of hope and suicidality by examining the relationship 
between external loci-of-hope and acquired capability for suicide. The research questions 
were: 
RQ1: Is there a relationship between external locus-of-hope (operationalized 
below as “general hope [external]”) and acquired capability for suicide? 
H01: There is no relationship between general hope (external) and acquired 
capability for suicide. 
Ha1: There is a negative relationship between general hope (external) and 
acquired capability for suicide. 
RQ2: Is there a relationship between general hope (external–family) and acquired 
capability for suicide? 
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H02: There is no relationship between general hope (external–family) and 
acquired capability for suicide. 
Ha2: There is a negative relationship between general hope (external–family) 
and acquired capability for suicide. 
RQ3: Is there a relationship between general hope (external–peers) and acquired 
capability for suicide? 
H03: There is no relationship between general hope (external–peers) and 
acquired capability for suicide. 
Ha3: There is a negative relationship between general hope (external–peers) 
and acquired capability for suicide. 
RQ4: Is there a relationship between general hope (external–spiritual) and 
acquired capability for suicide? 
H04: There is no relationship between general hope (external–spiritual) and 
acquired capability for suicide. 
Ha4: There is a negative relationship between general hope (external–spiritual) 
and acquired capability for suicide. 
In all cases, the independent variables were external hope and each of its three 
specific loci (external–family, external–peers, and external–spiritual), each as measured 
by its respective score on the Locus-of-Hope Scale (LOHS; Bernardo, 2010). The 
dependent variable was acquired capability for suicide, as measured by the Acquired 
Capability for Suicide Scale—Fearlessness About Death (ACSS-FAD; Ribeiro et al., 
2014). 
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This chapter includes information regarding how I conducted the data collection 
and the characteristics of the sample, statistical analyses I performed and their results, 
and a summary of how these results relate to the research questions. Discussion of the 
results and their implications will be found in Chapter 5. 
Data Collection 
I carried out data collection on December 11 and 12, 2017. I had originally 
contemplated recruiting participants from Walden University’s participant pool and 
supplementing that recruitment with Amazon’s Mechanical Turk service 
(www.mturk.com), an online platform through which individuals select and engage in a 
variety of tasks, including responding to surveys. However, because the participant pool 
only publicizes new studies at the beginning of each month, participants were first 
recruited through Mechanical Turk so as not to delay the progress of this study. Almost 
immediately, a suitably large research sample was obtained, making it unnecessary to 
solicit additional participants. Accordingly, I drew the sample exclusively through 
Mechanical Turk, which constitutes a change over the original data collection plan. I did 
so by loading all questions onto the online survey platform SurveyMonkey, to which 
interested Mechanical Turk users were directed by means of a dedicated link. I adapted 
the research questionnaires to reflect online administration, for example by replacing 
phrases like “indicate your responses on your answer sheet” to “indicate your responses 
by clicking the appropriate button.” All responses were anonymous. No adverse events 
(e.g., anxiety due to questions about death) were reported in the course of data collection. 
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Sizes of the Participant Pool and the Research Sample 
As of this writing, Amazon (the parent company of Mechanical Turk) claims 
upward of 500,000 registered users of Mechanical Turk but does not release data on the 
number of participants online at any given time—that is, the size of the pool for any 
potential study. Independent estimates, however, range from a low of about 7,300 
(Stewart et al., 2015) to a high of 42,912 (Fort, Adda, & Cohen, 2011). For the present 
study, a total of 244 responses was obtained. Of these, 17 were deleted due to missing 
data, such as omission of one or more of the four research questionnaires. An additional 
five cases were deleted because the speed with which they completed the survey—as 
reported by SurveyMonkey—was judged too fast to have possibly been legitimate. 
Finally, 29 more cases were deleted for missing data, this time if even one answer was 
lacking. This yielded a total of 193 fully complete and valid responses. 
Demographic Characteristics of the Sample 
Of this sample (N = 193), 39.9% reported their age as in the 30–39 range; 33.7% 
were 21–29; 15.0%, 40–49; 6.2%, 50–59; 3.1%, 18–20; and 2.1%, 60 or older. Men 
represented 59.1% of the sample; women, 40.4%; and one participant (0.5%) responded 
he or she preferred not to answer. People either married or in a domestic partnership or 
civil union constituted 36.3% of the sample; the remaining 63.7% identified as either 
widowed, divorced, separated, single but cohabiting with a significant other, or single and 
never married. A broad range of annual household income was reported, with 32.1% of 
the sample falling in the range $25,000.–$49,999.; 26.4%, $50,000.–$74,999.; 14.5%, 
$75,000.–$99,999.; 10.9%, $10,000.–$24,999.; 5.2%, $100,000.–$124,999.; 4.1%, $0.–
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$9,999.; 3.1%, $125,000.–$149,999.; 2.1%, $150,000.–$174,999.; 1.0%, $175,000.–
$199,999.; one participant (0.5%) responded he or she preferred not to answer. The 
overwhelming majority of the sample was White or Caucasian (80.3%), with the 
remainder identifying as Black or African American (7.3%); Asian or Pacific Islander 
(5.7%); Hispanic (4.1%); American Indian or Alaskan Native (0.5%); or Multiple 
Ethnicity or Other (2.1%). As for education, 39.4% of the sample reported having a 
bachelor’s degree; 19.2% stated they had some college but no degree; another 19.2% 
reported a high school degree or equivalent; 14.5%, an associate’s degree; 7.3%, a 
graduate degree; and one participant (0.5%) reported less than a high school degree. 
Finally, 26.9% of respondents identified with Christianity; 8.8% with Protestantism; 
7.8%, Catholicism; 1.6%, Buddhism; 1.0 %, Islam; another 1.0%, Inter- or Non-
denominational; 0.5% identified with Hinduism; and 1.6% with Multiple Religions or 
Other. Fully 50.3% of respondents indicated they identified with no religion. 
Representativeness of the Sample 
As noted in the previous chapter, use of convenience samples drawn from college 
student populations—despite being widely prevalent in psychological and other 
research—has raised concerns over the validity of conclusions purportedly generalized 
from this narrow population (e.g., Sears, 1986). The burgeoning popularity in recent 
years of Internet-based research samples may be attributed not only to the relative ease 
and cost effectiveness of such samples but to studies suggesting Internet samples are in 
fact more representative of the general population than traditional student samples (e.g., 
Gosling, Vazire, Srivastava, & John, 2004). In 2011, Buhrmester, Kwang, and Gosling 
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(2016) investigated Mechanical Turk in particular and concluded, “MTurk participants 
were more demographically diverse than standard Internet samples and significantly 
more diverse than typical American college samples” (p. 134).  Thus, the research sample 
used in the present study may be considered at least as representative as samples used in 
traditional psychology research and may well constitute an improvement over the 
samples used in prior studies of hope and suicidality (which used student convenience 
samples). This fortuitous result was not wholly foreseen before data collection 
commenced, because I had expected the sample would be drawn at least in part from a 
university participant pool. 
I conjectured that individuals available to answer surveys during the day may 
differ in important respects from those who do so at night. Because I expected that the 
desired number of participants would be found within a matter of hours, the question 
therefore arose whether to solicit responses (that is, to post the survey online) during 
daytime hours or at night. To better ensure a representative sample, I decided to do both; 
approximately half the participants (n = 92) responded on the afternoon of December 11, 
2017 (beginning approximately 2:30 p.m.), and the remainder (n = 101) responded that 
night or the night of December 12 (beginning approximately 9:30 p.m.).  
Screening Questions: A Methodological Issue 
Although not exclusive to online research, the growing popularity of this form of 
research has magnified a legitimate concern about data quality. As Berinsky, Margolis, 
and Sances (2014) point out, “without a researcher monitoring the flow of data, 
respondents can potentially breeze through the survey without paying attention. Our 
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research—and the research of other scholars—demonstrates that as many as half of all 
respondents behave in this manner” (p. 752). 
To counter this tendency—known as “satisficing”—researchers have adopted 
various techniques to detect and deal with satisficers. These generally involve embedding 
trick questions known variously as “instructional manipulation checks” (IMCs; 
Oppenheimer, Meyvis, & Davidenko, 2009), “screeners” (Berinsky et al., 2014), or 
“attention checks” (Vannette, 2017) into the survey, the answers to which make it 
obvious whether a participant was paying attention. However, the literature reflects some 
controversy over use of this technique. For reasons outside the scope of this dissertation, 
some scholars believe it is methodologically unsound to use such screening questions at 
all, others feel they can be used but it would be methodologically unsound to eliminate 
respondents based on the answers, and still others are unconcerned with either or both of 
the foregoing. For the present study, in which the underlying paper-and-pencil research 
instruments do not contain screening questions, I decided to remain outside this 
controversy and refrain from deliberately introducing them. This decision was based in 
part on the fact that two of the four prior studies in this line of research (Anestis et al., 
2014; O’Keefe & Wingate, 2013) used an online survey platform to administer the 
questionnaires (even though the samples were recruited from student populations) but 
apparently did not use screening questions. What is more, the online survey platform 
Qualtrics, reversing its prior position, recently recommended not using attention checks 
(Vannette, 2017). 
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Satisficing essentially decreases power by lowering the number of legitimate 
respondents (Oppenheimer et al., 2009). To counter this, and mindful of the assertion of 
Berinsky et al. (2014, p. 752) that “as many as half of all respondents behave in this 
manner,” a sample was sought for the present study approximately equal to twice the 
number required for statistical validity (which, as detailed in Chapter 3, was 107). After 
cleaning, the final sample size of 193—which is larger than in three of the four prior 
studies (whose sample sizes were 129, 115, 168, and 220, respectively)—is, I believe, 
adequate to counter the effect of any satisficing in the results. This is especially so in 
light of the finding by Berinsky and colleagues (Berinsky, Huber, & Lenz, 2012; 
Berinsky, et al., 2014) that Mechanical Turk respondents are more attentive—less likely 
to satisfice—than other online participants, which they attributed to “the MTurk 
population being accustomed to performing nonsurvey tasks where payment is 
conditional upon attention to detail” (2014, p. 745, n. 14). 
Results of the Study 
Zero-order correlations revealed that hope as traditionally defined by hope 
theory—operationalized here as General Hope (Internal) or GH(I), representing the 
construct internal locus-of-hope—was significantly negatively correlated with perceived 
burdensomeness (r = -.45, p < .001) and thwarted belongingness (r = -.62, p < .001), and 
significantly positively correlated with acquired capability for suicide (r = .20, p = .006). 
External locus-of-hope—operationalized here as General Hope (External) or GH(E)—
was significantly negatively correlated with perceived burdensomeness (r = -.27, p < 
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.001) and thwarted belongingness (r = -.60, p < .001), and not significantly correlated 
with acquired capability for suicide. 
As noted earlier, data collection was divided between a day group (n = 92) and a 
night group (n = 101). Independent samples t-tests revealed the two groups did not differ 
significantly on acquired capability for suicide or perceived burdensomeness, but did 
differ significantly on thwarted belongingness (M [Day] = 23.66, SD [Day] = 13.27, M 
[Night] = 28.67, SD [Night] = 14.51, t(191) = 2.50, p = .013). For this reason, Night was 
added as a covariate to that part of the regression analysis examining the relationship 
between the various forms of hope and thwarted belongingness. (Pursuant to the rule of 
thumb discussed in Chapter 3, this did not meaningfully affect the required sample size.) 
Correlations and descriptive statistics of the major study variables and covariates 
are contained in Table 1. 
 
Table 1 
Descriptive Data and Intercorrelations of Major Study Variables and Covariates 
 ACS PB TB GH(I) GH(E) Dep Fem Mar 
Age 
≥40 
Inc 
≤49,999 Night 
ACS 1           
PB -.02 1          
TB -.05 .63*** 1         
GH(I) .20** -.45*** -.62*** 1        
GH(E) -.06 -.27*** -.60*** .54*** 1       
Dep -.05 .75*** .73*** -.51*** -.31*** 1      
Fem -.20** .01 .05 -.14 -.05 .03 1     
Mar .02 -.18* -.23** .12 .24** -.23** .15* 1    
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Age≥40 -.01 -.15* -.12 .10 .02 -.14 .15* .12 1   
Inc≤49,999 .12 .04 .13 -.01 -.09 .09 -.02 -.35*** -.08 1  
Night .00 -.01 .18* -.15* -.19** .06 .09 -.06 .16* .15* 1 
Rangea 0–28 6–42 9–63 8–32 24–96 0–42 NA NA NA NA NA 
Meana 12.21 10.94 26.28 24.14 59.79 9.30 NA NA NA NA NA 
SDa 7.91 7.95 14.12 4.83 14.70 11.59 NA NA NA NA NA 
Note. N = 193. Significant correlations appear in bold. ACS = Acquired Capability for Suicide; PB = 
Perceived Burdensomeness; TB = Thwarted Belongingness; GH(I) = General Hope (Internal); GH(E) = 
General Hope (External); Dep = Depression; Fem = Female; Mar = Married; Inc ≤ 49,999 = Annual 
household income less than or equal to $49,999.; Night = Participant responded to survey at night; SD = 
Standard Deviation. 
aCovariates Female, Married, Age, Income, and Night are either dichotomous or were not measured in such 
a way as to make ranges, means, or standard deviations meaningful; their characteristics are described 
more fully in the text. 
*p < .05; ** p < .01; *** p < .001. 
 
Statistical Assumptions 
In all analyses reported below, data were examined to ensure they met the 
statistical assumptions necessary for multiple regression. For the sake of thoroughness, 
many separate analyses were performed, as set forth in Chapter 3. Steps 1 and 2 of this 
three-step hierarchical regression procedure involved entering the covariates (all except 
Night in analyses using acquired capability for suicide or perceived burdensomeness as 
the dependent variable; all six covariates when thwarted belongingness was the 
dependent variable) in step 1, then, in step 2, the covariates plus (in separate analyses for 
each) the various forms of hope operationalized in Chapter 3. However, the most 
important part of this investigation is step 3 of the regression, in which the covariates and 
internal locus-of-hope (GH[I]) are held constant, and (in separate analyses for each) the 
various forms of external locus-of-hope are entered. This entire process, which involved 
31 separate regressions, was repeated three times: once each to investigate the effect of 
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hope (in all its forms) on acquired capability for suicide, perceived burdensomeness, and 
thwarted belongingness, respectively. For purposes of the research question herein, the 
most telling of all these regressions is that in which acquired capability for suicide (ACS) 
was regressed on external locus-of-hope (GH[E]), with the covariates and GH(I) held 
constant. Accordingly, although statistical assumptions were tested and met in each of the 
93 individual regressions just elaborated, the specific values that follow are those 
associated with the main test of the research question, i.e., regression of ACS on GH(E). 
An analysis of standardized residuals showed the data contained no outliers (Std. 
Residual Min = -1.934, Std. Residual Max = 2.354). (Note, however, that in the series of 
regressions using perceived burdensomeness as the dependent variable, four outliers had 
to be removed; likewise, when thwarted belongingness was the dependent variable, two 
outliers had to be removed.) Multicollinearity was found not to be a concern; collinearity 
statistics are set forth in Table 2. The data met the assumption of independent errors 
(Durbin-Watson value = 1.83). Both the histogram of standardized residuals and the 
normal p-p plot of standardized residuals confirmed that errors were approximately 
normally distributed. In addition, the scatterplot of standardized residuals showed the 
data met the assumptions of homoscedasticity and linearity. Finally, the data also met the 
assumption of non-zero variances; variance statistics are included in Table 2. 
 
Table 2 
Collinearity and Variance Statistics for Regression of ACS on GH(E), Holding 
Covariates and GH(I) Constant 
                                       Collinearity Statistics  
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Predictor Tolerance VIF Variance 
Dep .71 1.42 134.42 
Fem .93 1.07 .24 
Mar .79 1.27 .23 
Age≥40 .95 1.06 .18 
Inc≤49,999 .87 1.14 .25 
GH(I) .56 1.79 23.30 
GH(E) .67 1.49 215.99 
Note. ACS = Acquired Capability for Suicide; GH(E) = General Hope (External); GH(I) = General Hope 
(Internal); VIF = Variance Inflation Factor; Dep = Depression; Fem = Female; Mar = Married; Inc ≤ 49,999 = 
Annual household income less than or equal to $49,999. 
 
Multiple Regression Analyses and Findings 
Following are results of the analyses that bear on the research question. All 
regressions used the Enter method. Each regression (general, pathways, and agency 
components of hope) was performed separately; for clarity and succinctness, however, 
results are presented together in the tables. 
Treatment of covariates. Covariates were depression, gender, marital status, age, 
and income (and, in the regressions of thwarted belongingness, day vs. night). Of these, 
only depression was measured on a scale (using the DASS-21 depression subscale, 
described in Chapter 3). The other variables were demographic in nature and were either 
dichotomous (gender and day vs. night); nominal with several levels (marital status); or 
measured in ranges (age and income). For purposes of the regressions, these demographic 
variables were converted into dummy variables as follows: 
Gender consisted of the categories Male, Female, and (to accommodate the 
response of one participant) Prefer Not to Answer. Female was used as the covariate, that 
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is, entered into the regressions (combining Male and the solitary Prefer Not to Answer 
into the reference group). 
Marital status data was treated such that the categories Married and In a Domestic 
Partnership or Civil Union were combined into the variable MarriedTruncated and the 
categories Widowed, Divorced, Separated, Single but Cohabiting with a Significant 
Other, and Single Never Married were combined into the variable SingleTruncated. 
MarriedTruncated was entered into the regressions; SingleTruncated was the reference 
group. 
Age data was combined such that the age ranges 18–20, 21–29, and 30–39 formed 
the variable AgeBelow40, and the ranges 40–49, 50–59, and 60 or Older, the variable 
Age40AndUp. Age40AndUp was entered into the regressions; AgeBelow40 was the 
reference group. 
Income data consolidated the ranges $0.–$9,999., $10,000.–$24,999., and 
$25,000.–$49,999. into the variable LowerIncome, and the ranges $50,000.–$74,999., 
$75,000.–$99,999., $100,000.–$124,999., $125,000.–$149,999., $150,000.–$174,999., 
$175,000.–$199,999., and one participant’s response of Prefer Not to Answer into the 
variable HigherIncome. LowerIncome was entered into the regressions; HigherIncome 
was the reference group. 
When regressing thwarted belongingness, Night was entered into the regression 
and Day was the reference group. 
The first set of analyses were designed to determine whether external locus-of-
hope (and/or its pathways and agency components) would negatively predict acquired 
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capability for suicide when depression, gender, marital status, age, and income, as well as 
internal locus-of-hope, were held constant. For thoroughness and consistency with prior 
research, separate analyses were also conducted to determine whether the above variables 
would negatively predict each of the other two components of the interpersonal theory of 
suicide, namely, perceived burdensomeness and thwarted belongingness. For the reason 
explained toward the beginning of the Results section, Night was added as a sixth 
covariate in the analyses of thwarted belongingness. Results were as follows: 
General hope (external). It was found that external locus-of-hope—GH(E)—
significantly negatively predicted acquired capability for suicide and accounted for 4.1% 
of the variance after controlling for internal locus-of-hope—GH(I)—and the covariates  
(β = -.25, t(192) = -2.94, p = .004, 95% CI = [-.22, -.04]; see Table 3). This was an 
important finding, on the basis of which the first null hypothesis was rejected; its 
ramifications will be elaborated upon in Chapter 5. GH(E) did not significantly predict 
perceived burdensomeness after controlling for GH(I) and the covariates (β = -.004, 
t(188) = -.08, p = .938, ns). GH(E) significantly negatively predicted thwarted 
belongingness and accounted for 6.7% of the variance after controlling for GH(I) and the 
covariates (β = -.32, t(191) = -6.46, p < .001, 95% CI = [-.40, -.21]; see Table 4). 
Pathways hope (external). The pathways component of external locus-of-hope—
PH(E)—significantly negatively predicted acquired capability for suicide and accounted 
for 4.6% of the variance after controlling for internal locus-of-hope—GH(I)—and the 
covariates (β = -.26, t(192) = -3.14, p = .002, 95% CI = [-.43, -.10]; see Table 3). PH(E) 
did not significantly predict perceived burdensomeness after controlling for GH(I) and 
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the covariates (β = -.002, t(188) = -.04, p = .971, ns). PH(E) significantly negatively 
predicted thwarted belongingness and accounted for 5.6% of the variance after 
controlling for GH(I) and the covariates (β = -.28, t(190) = -5.98, p < .001,  
95% CI = [-.70, -.35]; see Table 4). 
Agency hope (external). The agency component of external locus-of-hope—
AH(E)—significantly negatively predicted acquired capability for suicide and accounted 
for 3.2% of the variance after controlling for internal locus-of-hope—GH(I)—and the 
covariates (β = -.22, t(192) = -2.60, p = .010, 95% CI = [-.42, -.06]; see Table 3). AH(E) 
did not significantly predict perceived burdensomeness after controlling for GH(I) and 
the covariates (β = -.006, t(188) = -.12, p = .91, ns). AH(E) significantly negatively 
predicted thwarted belongingness and accounted for 6.7% of the variance after 
controlling for GH(I) and the covariates (β = -.32, t(190) = -6.67, p < .001,  
95% CI = [-.82, -.44]; see Table 4). 
 
Table 3 
External Locus-of-Hope (General, Pathways, and Agency) Predicting Acquired 
Capability for Suicide 
Predictors Entered b SE R2 R2Adj ΔR2 d.f. F for set 
Covariates + GH(I) .33* .14 .09 .06 .03 (6, 186) 3.17** 
Covariates + GH(I) + GH(E) -.13** .05 .13 .10 .04 (7, 185) 4.07*** 
Covariates + GH(I) + PH(E) -.26** .08 .14 .11 .05 (7, 185) 4.26*** 
Covariates + GH(I) + AH(E) -.24* .09 .13 .09 .03 (7, 185) 3.77** 
Note. GH(I) = General Hope (Internal); GH(E) = General Hope (External); PH(E) = Pathways Hope 
(External); AH(E) = Agency Hope (External). 
*p < .05; ** p < .01; *** p < .001 
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Table 4 
External Locus-of-Hope (General, Pathways, and Agency) Predicting Thwarted 
Belongingness 
Predictors Entered b SE R2 R2Adj ΔR2 d.f. F for set 
Covariates + GH(I) -1.03*** .15 .64 .63 .09 (6, 185) 54.04*** 
Covariates + GH(I) + GH(E) -.31*** .05 .70 .69 .07 (7, 184) 62.47*** 
Covariates + GH(I) + PH(E) -.53*** .09 .71 .70 .06 (7, 183) 64.77*** 
Covariates + GH(I) + AH(E) -.63*** .09 .72 .71 .07 (7, 183) 68.39*** 
Note. GH(I) = General Hope (Internal); GH(E) = General Hope (External); PH(E) = Pathways Hope 
(External); AH(E) = Agency Hope (External). 
*p < .05; ** p < .01; *** p < .001 
 
The second set of analyses were designed to determine whether external–family 
locus-of-hope (and/or its pathways and agency components) would negatively predict 
acquired capability for suicide when depression, gender, marital status, age, and income, 
as well as internal locus-of-hope, were held constant. As before, separate analyses were 
also conducted to determine whether the above variables would negatively predict each 
of the other two components of the interpersonal theory of suicide, namely, perceived 
burdensomeness and thwarted belongingness. Also as before, Night was added as a sixth 
covariate in the analyses of thwarted belongingness. Results were as follows: 
General hope (external–family). External–family locus-of-hope—GH(E-F)—
significantly negatively predicted acquired capability for suicide and accounted for 2.1% 
of the variance after controlling for internal locus-of-hope—GH(I)—and the covariates  
(β = -.19, t(192) = -2.10, p = .037, 95% CI = [-.47, -.02]; see Table 5). GH(E-F) did not 
significantly predict perceived burdensomeness after controlling for GH(I) and the 
covariates (β = -.03, t(188) = -.51, p = .609, ns). GH(E-F) significantly negatively 
predicted thwarted belongingness and accounted for 4.8% of the variance after 
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controlling for GH(I) and the covariates (β = -.28, t(190) = -5.42, p < .001,  
95% CI = [-.89, -.41]; see Table 6). 
Pathways hope (external–family). The pathways component of external–family 
locus-of-hope—PH(E-F)—significantly negatively predicted acquired capability for 
suicide and accounted for 2.6% of the variance after controlling for internal locus-of-
hope—GH(I)—and the covariates (β = -.20, t(192) = -2.35, p = .020,  
95% CI = [-.92, -.08]; see Table 5). PH(E-F) did not significantly predict perceived 
burdensomeness after controlling for GH(I) and the covariates (β = -.03, t(188) = -.53, 
 p = .599, ns). PH(E-F) significantly negatively predicted thwarted belongingness and 
accounted for 4.6% of the variance after controlling for GH(I) and the covariates  
(β = -.26, t(190) = -5.29, p < .001, 95% CI = [-.1.61, -.74]; see Table 6). 
Agency hope (external–family). The agency component of external–family 
locus-of-hope—AH(E-F)—did not significantly predict acquired capability for suicide 
after controlling for internal locus-of-hope—GH(I)—and the covariates (β = -.15,  
t(192) = -1.65, p = .101, ns; see Table 5). AH(E-F) did not significantly predict perceived 
burdensomeness after controlling for GH(I) and the covariates (β = -.03, t(188) = -.45,  
p = .653, ns). AH(E-F) significantly negatively predicted thwarted belongingness and 
accounted for 4.2% of the variance after controlling for GH(I) and the covariates  
(β = -.27, t(190) = -5.04, p < .001, 95% CI = [-1.71, -.75]; see Table 6). 
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Table 5 
External–Family Locus-of-Hope (General, Pathways, and Agency) Predicting Acquired 
Capability for Suicide 
Predictors Entered b SE R2 R2Adj ΔR2 d.f. F for set 
Covariates + GH(I) .33* .14 .09 .06 .03 (6, 186) 3.17** 
Covariates + GH(I) + GH(E-F) -.24* .12 .11 .08 .02 (7, 185) 3.40** 
Covariates + GH(I) + PH(E-F) -.50* .21 .12 .09 .03 (7, 185) 3.58** 
Covariates + GH(I) + AH(E-F)a -.38 .23 .11 .07 .01 (7, 185) 3.13** 
Note. GH(I) = General Hope (Internal); GH(E-F) = General Hope (External–Family); PH(E-F) = Pathways 
Hope (External–Family); AH(E-F) = Agency Hope (External–Family). 
aAH(E-F) was not a significant predictor in the model; however, the model was significant overall due to the 
contributions of covariates. 
*p < .05; ** p < .01; *** p < .001 
 
Table 6 
External–Family Locus-of-Hope (General, Pathways, and Agency) Predicting Thwarted 
Belongingness 
Predictors Entered b SE R2 R2Adj ΔR2 d.f. F for set 
Covariates + GH(I) -1.03*** .15 .64 .63 .09 (6, 185) 54.04*** 
Covariates + GH(I) + GH(E-F) -.65*** .12 .70 .69 .05 (7, 183) 62.12*** 
Covariates + GH(I) + PH(E-F) -1.17*** .22 .70 .69 .05 (7, 183) 61.55*** 
Covariates + GH(I) + AH(E-F) -1.23*** .24 .70 .69 .04 (7, 183) 60.47*** 
Note. GH(I) = General Hope (Internal); GH(E-F) = General Hope (External–Family); PH(E-F) = Pathways 
Hope (External–Family); AH(E-F) = Agency Hope (External–Family). 
*p < .05; ** p < .01; *** p < .001 
 
The third set of analyses were designed to determine whether external–peers 
locus-of-hope (and/or its pathways and agency components) would negatively predict 
acquired capability for suicide when depression, gender, marital status, age, and income, 
as well as internal locus-of-hope, were held constant. As before, separate analyses were 
also conducted to determine whether the above variables would negatively predict each 
of the other two components of the interpersonal theory of suicide, namely, perceived 
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burdensomeness and thwarted belongingness. Also as before, Night was added as a sixth 
covariate in the analyses of thwarted belongingness. Results were as follows: 
General hope (external–peers). External–peers locus-of-hope—GH(E-P)—did 
not significantly predict acquired capability for suicide after controlling for internal 
locus-of-hope—GH(I)—and the covariates (β = -.16, t(192) = -1.88, p = .061, ns; see 
Table 7). GH(E-P) did not significantly predict perceived burdensomeness after 
controlling for GH(I) and the covariates (β = .03, t(188) = .65, p = .52, ns). GH(E-P) 
significantly negatively predicted thwarted belongingness and accounted for 7.0% of the 
variance after controlling for GH(I) and the covariates (β = -.33, t(190) = -6.86, p < .001, 
95% CI = [-1.03, -.57]; see Table 8). 
Pathways hope (external–peers). The pathways component of external–peers 
locus-of-hope—PH(E-P)—significantly negatively predicted acquired capability for 
suicide and accounted for 2.1% of the variance after controlling for internal locus-of-
hope—GH(I)—and the covariates (β = -.17, t(192) = -2.11, p = .037,  
95% CI = [-.85, -.03]; see Table 7). PH(E-P) did not significantly predict perceived 
burdensomeness after controlling for GH(I) and the covariates (β = .03, t(188) = .61,  
p = .545, ns). PH(E-P) significantly negatively predicted thwarted belongingness and 
accounted for 5.9% of the variance after controlling for GH(I) and the covariates  
(β = -.29, t(190) = -6.14, p < .001, 95% CI = [-1.74, -.90]; see Table 8). 
Agency hope (external–peers). The agency component of external–peers locus-
of-hope—AH(E-P)—did not significantly predict acquired capability for suicide after 
controlling for internal locus-of-hope—GH(I)—and the covariates (β = -.13,  
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t(192) = -1.45, p = .148, ns]; see Table 7). AH(E-P) did not significantly predict 
perceived burdensomeness after controlling for GH(I) and the covariates (β = .03,  
t(188) = .63 p = .529, ns). AH(E-P) significantly negatively predicted thwarted 
belongingness and accounted for 7.0% of the variance after controlling for GH(I) and the 
covariates (β = -.33, t(190) = -6.82, p < .001, 95% CI = [-2.07, -1.14]; see Table 8). 
 
Table 7 
External–Peers Locus-of-Hope (General, Pathways, and Agency) Predicting Acquired 
Capability for Suicide 
Predictors Entered b SE R2 R2Adj ΔR2 d.f. F for set 
Covariates + GH(I) .33* .14 .09 .06 .03 (6, 186) 3.17** 
Covariates + GH(I) + GH(E-P)a -.22 .11 .11 .08 .02 (7, 185) 3.26** 
Covariates + GH(I) + PH(E-P) -.44* .21 .11 .08 .02 (7, 185) 3.40** 
Covariates + GH(I) + AH(E-P)a -.33 .23 .10 .07 .01 (7, 185) 3.04** 
Note. GH(I) = General Hope (Internal); GH(E-P) = General Hope (External–Peers); PH(E-P) = Pathways 
Hope (External–Peers); AH(E-P) = Agency Hope (External–Peers). 
aNeither GH(E-P) nor AH(E-P) were significant predictors in their respective models; however, the models 
were significant overall due to the contributions of covariates. 
*p < .05; ** p < .01; *** p < .001 
 
Table 8 
External–Peers Locus-of-Hope (General, Pathways, and Agency) Predicting Thwarted 
Belongingness 
Predictors Entered b SE R2 R2Adj ΔR2 d.f. F for set 
Covariates + GH(I) -1.03*** .15 .64 .63 .09 (6, 185) 54.04*** 
Covariates + GH(I) + GH(E-P) -.80*** .12 .73 .72 .07 (7, 183) 69.49*** 
Covariates + GH(I) + PH(E-P) -1.32*** .22 .72 .70 .06 (7, 183) 65.59*** 
Covariates + GH(I) + AH(E-P) -1.61*** .24 .73 .72 .07 (7, 183) 69.22*** 
Note. GH(I) = General Hope (Internal); GH(E-P) = General Hope (External–Peers); PH(E-P) = Pathways 
Hope (External–Peers); AH(E-P) = Agency Hope (External–Peers). 
*p < .05; ** p < .01; *** p < .001 
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The fourth set of analyses were designed to determine whether external–spiritual 
locus-of-hope (and/or its pathways and agency components) would negatively predict 
acquired capability for suicide when depression, gender, marital status, age, and income, 
as well as internal locus-of-hope, were held constant. As before, separate analyses were 
also conducted to determine whether the above variables would negatively predict each 
of the other two components of the interpersonal theory of suicide, namely, perceived 
burdensomeness and thwarted belongingness. Also as before, Night was added as a sixth 
covariate in the analyses of thwarted belongingness. Results were as follows: 
General hope (external–spiritual). External–spiritual locus-of-hope— 
GH(E-S)—significantly negatively predicted acquired capability for suicide and 
accounted for 1.9% of the variance after controlling for internal locus-of-hope—GH(I)—
and the covariates (β = -.15, t(192) = -1.98, p = .049, 95% CI = [-.268, -.001]; see Table 
9). GH(E-S) did not significantly predict perceived burdensomeness after controlling for 
GH(I) and the covariates (β = -.01, t(188) = -.20, p = .841, ns). GH(E-S) significantly 
negatively predicted thwarted belongingness and accounted for 0.8% of the variance after 
controlling for GH(I) and the covariates (β = -.10, t(190) = -2.12, p = .035,  
95% CI = [-.30, -.01]; see Table 10). 
Pathways hope (external–spiritual). The pathways component of external–
spiritual locus-of-hope—PH(E-S)—significantly negatively predicted acquired capability 
for suicide and accounted for 2.0% of the variance after controlling for internal locus-of-
hope—GH(I)—and the covariates (β = -.15, t(192) = -2.03, p = .044,  
95% CI = [-.54, -.01]; see Table 9). PH(E-S) did not significantly predict perceived 
120 
 
burdensomeness after controlling for GH(I) and the covariates (β = -.01, t(188) = -.12,  
p = .904, ns). PH(E-S) did not significantly predict thwarted belongingness after 
controlling for GH(I) and the covariates (β = -.09, t(190) = -1.87, p = .063, ns; see Table 
10). 
Agency hope (external–spiritual). The agency component of external–spiritual 
locus-of-hope—AH(E-S)—did not significantly predict acquired capability for suicide 
after controlling for internal locus-of-hope—GH(I)—and the covariates (β = -.14,  
t(192) = -1.90, p = .059, ns; see Table 9). AH(E-S) did not significantly predict perceived 
burdensomeness after controlling for GH(I) and the covariates (β = -.01, t(188) = -.28,  
p = .783, ns). AH(E-S) significantly negatively predicted thwarted belongingness and 
accounted for 1.0% of the variance after controlling for GH(I) and the covariates  
(β = -.11, t(190) = -2.33, p = .021, 95% CI = [-.61, -.05]; see Table 10). 
 
Table 9 
External–Spiritual Locus-of-Hope (General, Pathways, and Agency) Predicting Acquired 
Capability for Suicide 
Predictors Entered b SE R2 R2Adj ΔR2 d.f. F for set 
Covariates + GH(I) .33* .14 .09 .06 .03 (6, 186) 3.17** 
Covariates + GH(I) + GH(E-S) -.13* .07 .11 .08 .02 (7, 185) 3.32** 
Covariates + GH(I) + PH(E-S) -.28* .14 .11 .08 .02 (7, 185) 3.35** 
Covariates + GH(I) + AH(E-S)a -.25 .13 .11 .08 .02 (7, 185) 3.27** 
Note. GH(I) = General Hope (Internal); GH(E-S) = General Hope (External–Spiritual); PH(E-S) = Pathways 
Hope (External–Spiritual); AH(E-S) = Agency Hope (External–Spiritual). 
aAH(E-S) was not a significant predictor in the model; however, the model was significant overall due to the 
contributions of covariates. 
*p < .05; ** p < .01; *** p < .001 
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Table 10 
External–Spiritual Locus-of-Hope (General, Pathways, and Agency) Predicting 
Thwarted Belongingness 
Predictors Entered b SE R2 R2Adj ΔR2 d.f. F for set 
Covariates + GH(I) -1.03*** .15 .64 .63 .09 (6, 185) 54.04*** 
Covariates + GH(I) + GH(E-S) -.16* .07 .66 .65 .01 (7, 183) 51.78*** 
Covariates + GH(I) + PH(E-S)a -.28 .15 .66 .65 .01 (7, 183) 51.36*** 
Covariates + GH(I) + AH(E-S) -.34* .15 .67 .65 .01 (7, 183) 52.17*** 
Note. GH(I) = General Hope (Internal); GH(E-S) = General Hope (External–Spiritual); PH(E-S) = Pathways 
Hope (External–Spiritual); AH(E-S) = Agency Hope (External–Spiritual). 
aPH(E-S) was not a significant predictor in the model; however, the model was significant overall due to the 
contributions of covariates. 
*p < .05; ** p < .01; *** p < .001 
 
Summary 
The above statistics reveal the following answers to the research questions: 
1) External locus-of-hope, as a general construct, significantly lowered acquired 
capability for suicide. Detailed analysis of the data showed both pathways and agency 
components of external locus-of-hope had this effect. This supports the hypothesis 
predicting a negative relationship between external locus-of-hope and acquired capability 
for suicide, and null hypothesis 1 is therefore rejected. This result constitutes an 
important contribution to our knowledge of hope and its relation to the interpersonal 
theory of suicide, because this relation had never been examined with respect to external 
locus-of-hope. It is especially significant in light of the fact that heretofore, hope was 
thought to raise, rather than lower, acquired capability for suicide. The present result 
shows it is only internal locus-of-hope that does so, but external locus-of-hope has the 
opposite (and more intuitive) effect. This will be discussed further in Chapter 5. 
With respect to the three specific forms of external locus-of-hope: 
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2) External–family locus-of-hope significantly lowered acquired capability for 
suicide. Detailed analysis of the data showed it was the pathways component and not the 
agency component that had this effect. Overall, however, failure of the effect of the 
agency component to achieve statistical significance was not enough to prevent the effect 
of the general construct from doing so, and null hypothesis 2 is therefore rejected in favor 
of the alternative hypothesis predicting a negative relationship between external–family 
locus-of-hope and acquired capability for suicide. 
3) External–peers locus-of-hope did not significantly affect acquired capability 
for suicide. However, detailed analysis of the data showed the pathways component (but 
not the agency component) of external–peers locus-of-hope did significantly lower 
acquired capability for suicide. Put another way, it was the agency component that 
prevented external–peers locus-of-hope as a whole from reaching significance. The third 
hypothesis—predicting a negative relationship between external–peers locus-of-hope and 
acquired capability for suicide—is therefore partially supported insofar as it applies to the 
pathways component of external–peers locus-of-hope. Nevertheless, null hypothesis 3, 
which refers to the general construct of external–peers locus-of-hope, cannot be rejected. 
4) External–spiritual locus-of-hope significantly lowered acquired capability for 
suicide. Detailed analysis of the data showed it was the pathways component and not the 
agency component that had this effect. Overall, however, failure of the effect of the 
agency component to achieve statistical significance was not enough to prevent the effect 
of the general construct from doing so, and null hypothesis 4 is therefore rejected in favor 
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of the alternative hypothesis predicting a negative relationship between external–spiritual 
locus-of-hope and acquired capability for suicide. 
The above findings, as well as those related to the effects of external locus-of-
hope on perceived burdensomeness and thwarted belongingness, shed important light on 
the workings of hope and bring us closer to understanding its nature—as will be 
discussed in Chapter 5. 
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Chapter 5: Discussion, Conclusions, and Recommendations 
Introduction 
Bernardo (2010) extended hope theory by introducing the construct of external 
locus-of-hope; hope as previously conceptualized by Snyder and colleagues (e.g., Snyder, 
1994, 2002; Snyder et al., 1991) can by contrast be thought of as internal locus-of-hope. 
Research into the relationship of hope to the three components—perceived 
burdensomeness, thwarted belongingness, and acquired capability for suicide—of the 
interpersonal theory of suicide (Joiner, 2005; Van Orden et al., 2010) found (internal) 
hope lowers perceived burdensomeness and thwarted belongingness but, unexpectedly, 
raises acquired capability for suicide. The purpose of this study was to contribute to the 
understanding of hope and suicidality by examining the relationship between external 
loci-of-hope and acquired capability for suicide. I found that, in contrast to internal locus-
of-hope, external locus-of-hope lowers, rather than raises, acquired capability for suicide. 
Interpretation of the Findings 
In the present study, I examined the independent effect of external locus-of-hope 
by holding internal locus-of-hope constant. As a preliminary step, however, I replicated 
the studies of Davidson et al. (2009) and their successors in this line of research by 
identifying the effect of internal locus-of-hope on the three components of the IPTS, 
holding constant the covariates used by prior researchers. (In that regard, the present 
study is also an extension of prior work, because I used a broader population than the 
student samples used previously.) Results confirmed internal locus-of-hope raises 
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acquired capability for suicide and lowers perceived burdensomeness and thwarted 
belongingness (see Tables 3 and 4). 
When Davidson et al. (2009) first made this unexpected finding, they suggested it 
may be because acquired capability for suicide results from painful and provocative 
events (Joiner, 2005; Van Orden et al., 2010): since high-hope individuals likely have 
more goals and engage in more attempts to reach these, they also likely have more 
experience of failure and pain that contribute, through habituation, to acquired capability 
for suicide. Another explanation was advanced by Mitchell et al. (2015), who, citing 
Snyder (1994), observed suicide itself may be a final act of hope, in that those who 
perceive themselves as able to carry out their goals may be more capable of carrying out 
the goal of suicide. Yet the present results highlight the inadequacy of such explanations: 
they may be true insofar as they apply to internal locus-of-hope, but they do not 
encompass the construct of hope in its entirety. One reason Davidson et al.’s finding was 
counterintuitive (as evidenced by it having been contrary to their initial hypothesis) is 
undoubtedly that English speakers understand the word “hope” to mean much more than 
the cognitive belief that one can find a path to a goal. Indeed, well over a thousand years 
ago, earliest uses of the word (Hope, n.d.) refer to hope in G-d—an idea that lies squarely 
outside the bounds of Snyder et al.’s (1991) definition (as used by Davidson et al. and 
successors) and that would today be called external locus-of-hope. 
This study sheds new light on the relationship between hope and the IPTS by 
adding external locus-of-hope back into the equation. In so doing, it also broadens our 
understanding of hope itself by elucidating how internal- and external locus-of-hope 
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differentially contribute to a person’s perception of him- or herself as burdensome, 
belonging, or capable of suicide. 
With respect to acquired capability for suicide, results showed that although it 
was lowered by external locus-of-hope generally (including both pathways and agency 
components), an important difference came to light when the three forms of external 
locus-of-hope were examined separately. In each case—external–family, external–peers, 
and external–spiritual—the agency component of external locus-of-hope failed to show a 
statistically significant effect on acquired capability for suicide. In the case of external–
peers, the general construct—combining both pathways and agency components—was 
likewise not significant; however, it is possible this was due to the influence of the 
agency component. Further research is needed to explore the reason one’s perception of 
the agency of external others functions differently from one’s perception of the pathways 
available to external others in its effect on one’s own acquired capability for suicide. 
Results also demonstrated that external locus-of hope—regardless of which 
form—had no statistically significant effect on perceived burdensomeness. Initially, this 
finding seemed surprising, since internal locus-of-hope had been shown to lower 
perceived burdensomeness. On reflection, however, this result makes a great deal of 
sense: By definition, external locus-of-hope means one’s hopes reside in others; that is, 
one believes one’s chances of achieving one’s goals depend not on one’s own capabilities 
but on those of others. It is perfectly understandable that someone who relies primarily on 
others would not be likely to perceive oneself as less of a burden because of that reliance. 
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Finally, results showed that, with the anomalous exception of PH(E-S)—the 
pathways component of external–spiritual locus-of-hope—external locus-of-hope (in all 
its forms), consistent with results for internal locus-of-hope, significantly lowered 
thwarted belongingness. This result, too, is eminently reasonable, and by the same logic 
as that discussed in the previous paragraph: the very fact that one’s hopes reside in others 
implies one has others upon whom to rely—that is, one has connections; one belongs. 
Limitations of the Study 
In Chapter 1, several limitations to this study were presented. To these must be 
added the following, arising from execution of the study: 
In contrast with previous research, participants were recruited entirely online. 
While this may well constitute a methodological advantage over student convenience 
samples, there is no way to be certain of its effect; the possibility exists, though remote, 
that the online nature of recruitment and data collection may have affected the results. 
Some data that could have been collected on a continuum (age and income) were 
instead collected in the form of ranges. Although these variables were converted in a 
statistically sound way into dummy variables, there is a possibility that treating them as 
dichotomous rather than continuous may have affected the analysis. 
 As discussed in the preceding chapter, online survey research is the subject of 
controversy on the issue of screening questions. The rationale for not using these has 
been set forth in that discussion, but a small possibility exists that had screening 
questions been included in the survey, results would have been different. 
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Recommendations 
In light of the results described above, future researchers should examine why 
agency hope functions differently from pathways hope in the context of external locus-of-
hope’s effect on acquired capability for suicide. 
More broadly, since external locus-of-hope has been shown (in the present study 
as well as those discussed in Chapter 2) to be an important construct that functions 
differently from internal locus-of-hope, researchers in the field of hope should no longer 
limit their inquiries to internal locus-of-hope, but should include external locus-of-hope 
in future studies. 
In addition, as mentioned in Chapter 1, I relied on the definition of hope first 
propounded by Snyder et al. (1991) as extended by Bernardo (2010), as well as the 
interpersonal theory of suicide (Joiner, 2005; Van Orden et al., 2010).  I did not consider 
other theories of hope and/or suicide in this study, leaving open the possibility of 
different results if, for example, I had defined and measured hope differently. By doing 
so, future researchers could shed important additional light on the relationship between 
hope and suicide, as well as on the elusive nature of hope itself. 
Implications 
The finding that external locus-of-hope lowers rather than raises acquired 
capability for suicide must be understood for what it is: It does not (necessarily) mean 
that once a person has acquired the capability for suicide, that capability can be lessened 
or weakened by external locus-of-hope. Indeed, as Van Orden et al. (2010) pointed out, 
acquisition of capability for suicide may be difficult to reverse. Rather, the present 
129 
 
finding means that statistically, the likelihood of possessing acquired capability for 
suicide is lower in a person who has external locus-of-hope than in a person without 
external locus-of-hope. 
This has implications for positive social change in the form of new 
recommendations for treatment. As Van Orden et al. (2010) have written: 
According to the [IPTS], interventions that directly or indirectly address 
perceived burdensomeness and thwarted belongingness should produce the best 
outcomes among suicidal individuals. The acquired capability would be relatively 
difficult to effectively address in treatment because a therapist is not able to 
modify a patient’s history, but this aspect of the theory does provide a clear 
prediction regarding who may benefit most from suicide focused preventive 
interventions: specifically, those who have a history fraught with painful and 
provocative experiences. (p. 592) 
The above is because painful and provocative experiences develop into acquired 
capability for suicide. Knowing, as we now do, that the likelihood of this occurring is 
reduced among those with external locus-of-hope, it is clear that an important and 
potentially life-saving treatment approach with individuals at risk for suicide would be to 
help them develop the perspective that their goals (relief from suffering, solution to 
problems, success, etc.) do not entirely depend on their own resources and abilities but 
may be acquired with help from family, peers, spiritual forces—in short, to help foster in 
them external locus-of-hope. 
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Conclusion 
Hope is a powerful force in human nature, a strong motivator toward goals one 
might not otherwise undertake. In this study I extended and clarified prior research into 
the relationship between hope and the interpersonal theory of suicide by showing that, in 
contrast to internal locus-of-hope, external locus-of-hope lowers, rather than raises, 
acquired capability for suicide. This finding suggests an important new treatment 
approach for individuals at risk for suicide. 
In a broader sense, this research highlights the fundamental importance of human 
interconnectedness and mutual reliance, as well as faith in something beyond ourselves. 
These are at the heart of external locus-of-hope, and, while we do not yet fully 
understand how they work to promote resilience and well-being, research suggests they 
do. Like prayer and faith, which have been shown to have a positive effect on 
psychological and even physical well-being (e.g., Alawiyah, Bell, Pyles, & Runnels, 
2011; Narayanasamy & Narayanasamy, 2008), external locus-of-hope may be a positive 
force in human wellness. 
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Appendix A: Permissions 
Permissions for Use of Measures 
The LOHS 
Following is email correspondence between the present researcher and the author 
of the LOHS granting permission for its use: 
Yitzchok Wagshul...Jul 17 [2016] 
to…  
Dear Dr. Bernardo: 
I am a doctoral candidate in clinical psychology doing my dissertation on the 
relationship between hope and suicidality. This reflects a broader interest in the 
construct of hope which I have had for some time. In that context, I read with 
great appreciation your 2010 article extending Snyder's hope theory to include the 
concept of locus-of-hope, for I had long believed there was more to hope than 
one's individual approach to goal attainment. Your innovation of external locus-
of-hope has, I feel, made hope theory more true to life, and for that I sincerely 
thank you. 
For my dissertation, I plan to measure hope in participants and analyze its 
relationship to the components of Joiner's interpersonal-psychological theory of 
suicide. I would greatly appreciate it if you would allow me to use your Locus-of-
Hope Scale, which, as far as I have been able to determine, is not publicly 
available. Needless to say, you would be given full credit for such permission, and 
I am sure I would be willing to comply with any reasonable conditions you might 
149 
 
require. If there are any questions I can answer, I can be reached by return email 
at… 
Thank you so very much for your consideration. I look forward to hearing from 
you. 
Sincerely, 
Yitzchok Wagshul, M.S. 
Walden University 
College of Social and Behavioral Sciences 
School of Psychology 
Ph.D. Program in Clinical Psychology 
 
Allan Bernardo…Jul 18 [2016] 
to…  
Dear Yitzchok Wagshul, 
Thank you for your interest in using the Locus-of-hope scale. Attached is the most 
updated version we use in our research. 
I only have two requests regarding your use of the scale: (a) please do not share 
with other researchers without my permisssion [sic] (if there are others who wish 
to use it, they can email me); and (b) please share with me whatever reports our 
[sic] publications you have that use the scale. You can email me at…. 
150 
 
I also took the liberty of sending you some recent publications that use the scale. 
They might help you conceptualize the scope and limits of the external locus-of-
hope scales. 
Best, 
Allan 
The INQ-15 
Following is email correspondence between the present researcher and Dr. 
Thomas Joiner, Jr., coauthor of the DSI-SS and director of the Laboratory for the Study 
and Prevention of Suicide-Related Conditions and Behaviors at Florida State University, 
where the ACSS-FAD, INQ-15, and PPES were developed, granting permission for their 
use: 
Yitzchok D. Wagshul 
Sun 7/9/2017 8:50 PM 
To: … 
July 9, 2017 
Thomas Joiner, Ph.D. 
Robert O. Lawton Distinguished Professor of Psychology 
Director, Laboratory for the Study and Prevention of Suicide-Related Conditions 
and Behaviors 
Florida State University 
Department of Psychology 
…                                                                                     By email to: … 
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Dear Professor Joiner: 
I am a doctoral candidate in clinical psychology doing my dissertation on the 
relationship between hope and suicidality. I truly appreciate your generosity in 
making important interpersonal theory of suicide (IPTS)-related assessments 
available on your suicide laboratory website at Florida State University. I assume 
this means you permit and encourage other researchers to use the instruments in 
question, but to avoid misunderstanding and to comply with my own university’s 
requirements, I formally request permission to use the instruments posted on your 
website: the Acquired Capability for Suicide Scale - Fearlessness About Death 
(ACSS-FAD); Brief Agitation Measure (BAM) Self-Report; Depressive 
Symptom Index: Suicidality Subscale (DSI-SS); Interpersonal Needs 
Questionnaire (INQ-15); Painful and Provocative Events Scale (PPES); Risk 
Identification Packet; and Risk Assessment Packet. Needless to say, when using 
such an instrument I will appropriately reference the applicable article.... 
Sincerely, 
Yitzchok Wagshul, M.S. 
Walden University 
College of Social and Behavioral Sciences 
School of Psychology 
Ph.D. Program in Clinical Psychology 
 
Thomas Joiner … 
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Today [7/10/17], 12:22 PM 
Yitzchok D. Wagshul 
hello Yitzchok - all permissions granted.... 
Best, Thomas. 
The ACSS-FAD 
See above under the heading “INQ-15.” 
The DASS-21 
The DASS questionnaire (including 42-item and 21-item versions) is in the public 
domain. Following is a quote from the Frequently Asked Questions (FAQ) page of the 
DASS website (Psychology Foundation of Australia, n.d.): 
 3.  How do I get permission to use the DASS? 
The DASS questionnaire is public domain, and so permission is not needed to use 
it. The DASS questionnaires and scoring key may be downloaded from the DASS 
website and copied without restriction (go to Download page). 
The DASS questionnaires and scoring key may also be distributed, published or 
made available electronically, with the restrictions that: 
a) the scales are not modified, 
b) the scales are not sold for profit, 
c) the intended audience is researchers or health professionals rather than end 
users, and 
d) reference is included to the DASS website: www.psy.unsw.edu.au/dass/ 
